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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Description of Leasing Arrangements 
In all societies in which private property is prevalent, leasing 
systems are among the institutions which have an impact on the economic 
efficiency of food and fiber production. Leasing arrangements may also 
affect the distribution of national and agricultural income as evidenced 
in certain less developed areas* where agricultural tenancy is associated 
with wide income differentials. 
A considerable part of the world agricultural resources is used on 
farms operated under different types of leases. "It is estimated that 
tenants and their families amount to some 600 million people, that is about 
two-fifths of the world population engaged in agriculture (28, p. 1). In 
certain developed countries*, tenancy may reach 77 percent of all farmers 
as in Scotland although it is much less prevalent in some countries like 
Denmark or Germany. In less developed nations, tenant farmers account for 
a considerable percentage of all farmers. Such is the case of India with 
53 percent and Formosa with 40 percent. Thailand and parts of Indochina, 
however, show low percentages of tenancy. Latin America in which "the 
"hacienda" tenure system is most prevalent presents certain modalities of 
peasant sub-tenancy which on the whole may be less significant than in 
other regions of the globe. 
*Less developed countries are defined in terms of the United Nations' 
concept of less than $100 per capita income per year. Developed countries 
refer to countries with $100 or more per capita income per year. 
2 
In the United States approximately one-third of all commercial farms 
are operated by tenants (40, p. 153). In certain midwestern states, e.g. 
Iowa, leased land comprises more than 50 percent of all farm land (4, 
p.5). 
Even in highly developed economies rental arrangements are not only 
determined by the forces of the free-market but also by customs and the 
relative bargaining power of landlords and tenants. Therefore, it appears 
important to investigate the effects of different leasing systems on the 
resource allocation of agricultural enterprises. 
1. Nature and functions of farm leases 
Tenure systems can be defined as the manner in which rights in land 
are held by farm operators. These rights assure control of varying 
degrees over resources and are acquired by alternative means including 
ownership and pooling of resources cmong two or more individuals. 
Tenancy falls in the latter category which is only one of three major 
forms of land tenure, namely, tenancy, owner-operatorship and group 
tenure, and it (tenancy) may complement or substitute for owner-operator-
ship. In effect, rental agreements introduce flexibility in the tenure 
system, by providing means of modifying the size of the agricultural 
enterprise, steps toward acquiring ownership by landless farmers and 
also of transferring the farm from one generation to the other. The 
instrument through which landlord and tenant agreements are stipulated 
is the lease. 
A lease is defined as a written or oral contract between a landlord 
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(the one owning or controlling a tract of land operated by a renter) and a 
tenant or renter, the operator of the leased tract of land, concerning 
use of resources for a given period and a specified payment (IS, p. 83). 
The lease, by providing an institutional framework within which 
individuals can pool their resources and work together as a team, performs 
various functions. This study is concerned primarily with the economic 
function. In a price economy the lease acts as an allocator of resources 
between different production plans. It also has the important function of 
allocating income between the landlord and tenant. A lease is considered 
efficient or "perfect", if its terms allow for an allocation of both land­
lord's and tenant's resources in the same way as they would be allocated 
on an owner-operated farm. Besides, the "perfect" lease requires that the 
total income obtained by both landlord and tenant on a leased farm must be 
equal to that earned by an owner-operator who maximizes the net value of 
the farm output from given resources at existing input and output prices.* 
Thus, the lease may perform a decisive role in arriving at an effi­
cient allocation of resources and at an equitable distribution of returns.2 
However, a lease has other functions which are also important. 
Tinssions calls them social functions (30, p. 9). These are the following: 
1) It permits tenants with limited resources to begin farming. This is of 
*These conditions for efficiency of a lease will be analyzed in detail 
in Chapter II. 
A^n equitable distribution of income is defined as that which assures 
the resource contributor the marginal return of his resource. However, 
this definition may have little application in certain less developed 
countries in which the marginal productivity of the tenant labor is so low 
that it provides insufficient means of survival. 
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special interest if society adopts as one of its goals the access to 
ownership through tenancy by farm operators ; 2) It might make good use of 
superior training and experience of landlords who can offer their advice 
to young farmers ; 3) In case of agrarian reform, it constitutes an orderly 
means of transferring use and occupancy rights in property. It is also a 
means of transferring farms from father to son; 4) A well conceived and 
adequately implemented leasing arrangement may bring about the strengthen­
ing of democracy in the so-called less developed countries through the 
elimination of social unrest. 
2. Types of leases 
Leases vary widely between different countries and between regions of 
the same country. Since the empirical part of this study will be confined 
to the Midwestern United States, only a brief description of the most 
common leases of the United States will be presented. A cash lease is one 
in which the specified payment is an amount of money. In other words, the 
landlord receives a fixed cash rent for the entire farm or tracts of land 
and the tenant gets all the receipts thereof. 
A crop-share lease provides payment to the landlord in the form of a 
share of the crops and a crop-share-cash lease adds, in addition to the 
share of crops, a specified payment as cash rent. The usual crop-share 
lease provides for the sharing of receipts and expenses on a 50:50 basis 
for most crops. The fixed cash-rent received under a crop-share-cash lease 
by the landlord usually comes as a rental payment for hay and pasture land; 
the tenant obtains all the returns from those two latter enterprises. A 
livestock-share lease is an agreement by which the income from bqth live-
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stock and crop enterprises is shared by the landlord and tenant. Usually 
the farms under this type of lease have livestock production as their major 
source of income. (19, p. 83). 
It can be noted that the soundness of a tenancy system, as well as 
any other agrarian structure, is related to economic efficiency and econom­
ic development of the country in which that system is established. In 
effect, institutions which in a complex society are needed to regulate the 
action of the individuals can have impeding or beneficial effect on the 
efficiency of the economy and thus affect its rate of economic growth. 
B. Previous Empirical Research 
In recent years, considerable research has been undertaken in the 
United States to determine empirically the nature and magnitude of the mis-
allocation of resources within firms resulting from leasing arrangements. 
The mlsallocatlon of resources or inefficiencies can be expressed in terms 
of deviations within the existential situation from the norm of optimal 
efficiency for a leased farm provided by economic theory. 
The general approach to these problems consists of three steps: 1) 
Establish the proportion of the deviations from optimal conditions in 
resource allocation, that can be attributed to leasing systems per se. 
However » other factors such as price and yield uncertainties, managerial 
ability, may also have an impact on economic efficiency. Therefore, this 
first step has a delimiting character. 2) Discover how the different 
tenure classes or sub-classes account for the gap, between the norm and 
the actual situation, which can be attributed per se to tenure arrange­
ments. This second step has the character of a diagnostic hypothesis and 
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its purpose is to isolate the effects of different tenure factors -- type 
of lease, length of leasg, mortgage encumbrance, etc. -- and measure their 
impact on resource allocation. 3) Test remedial hypotheses in order to 
find arrangements compatible with optimum resource allocation. 
The principal research projects have made use of three types of tech­
niques (37): descriptive analysis mainly based on interview surveys and 
secondary data (2, 4, 18, 19, 31), single equation models for marginal 
analysis (11, 14, 25), and finally linear programming (5, 13, 24, 28).* 
The first class of technique has been used with success. The sources 
of evidence may include farm records kept by local or state business 
associations, field interviews with tenants and landlord, written question­
naires sent by mail, related research studies, United States Census of 
Agriculture reports, and cost, price and production data on file in crop 
and livestock reporting services. The Hurlburt study is a good example 
of this type of research (19). 
The second empirical procedure uses single equation models, i.e., 
production functions fitted to the data obtained from stratified or pur­
posive farm samples. It usually consists of two parts : 1) A general 
analysis which outlines the main features of the tenure systems investi­
gated. The tenure classes considered in these studies have been the 
"typical" ones of each region; 2) The estimation of the degree by which 
each tenure or lease system achieves the efficient norm in resource 
*This classification evidently is not a clear cut one. There is a 
certain overlapping in the methods and goals of the three techniques. The 
first two techniques are more of a positive type of analysis and the last 
one is more of a normative nature. 
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allocation. Most of the studies use Cobb-Douglas functions fitted to data 
obtained from the farm samples, by means of regression analysis. 
The main results of the studies conducted in the Midwest show that 
among factors of production, capital services is the 1imitating factor 
for owner-operators, and land for livestock and crop-share renters (11, 
14, 25). 
The single equation models employed to estimate tenure parameters 
and appraise the efficiency of the leasing system present certain advan­
tages but they also possess some serious limitations. These are due to 
problems of aggregation of inputs and outputs, of the failure to include 
in the function certain variables such as managerial ability and, also, 
quality differentials of the labor input are usually disregarded. These 
limitations raise serious doubts about the significance of the results 
obtained from Cobb-Douglas functions. 
All the disadvantages mentioned with regard to single equation models 
perhaps have made researchers turn their attention to a relatively new 
technique in approaching problems of land tenure and economic efficiency. 
Linear programming even if not a substitute for single equation models, 
has proved to be a useful technique. The underlying assumptions of the 
two models are different and their purposes are also different. The pro­
duction function gives factual information about a given situation. It is, 
therefore, a part of so-called positive economics. Linear programming 
strives to obtain a certain optimum production plan for a particular firm, 
given some limitations in resource availability and having a specified 
end to maximize (6, 12, 36). This technique belongs rather to a normative 
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type of economics . 
The technique is called linear programming because it maximizes (or 
minimizes) a certain linear function (profits or costs) subject to certain 
restrictions or limitations. The choice criterion is usually the net 
prices of products (or the prices of factors). Linear programming sup­
poses the existence of alternative ways or possibilities in the combina­
tion of resources and products. To use linear programming efficiently, 
there must be several production possibilities because if there were only 
a few alternatives, budgeting could successfully replace linear program­
ming. These alternatives are called activities or processes: it is assumed 
that each combination of resources along a production function is a dif­
ferent activity. Another important feature of linear programming is that 
it deals with short-run situations and therefore with firms which have a 
fixed plant and are subject to limitations in land, capital, etc. It 
also assumes constant returns to scale. 
Taken as a guiding criterion the necessary conditions for leasing 
efficiency, namely that the optimum plan for tenant and landlord must be 
the same, and the sufficient condition, that the optimum plan for the farm 
as a whole, given a certain quantity of resources, must coincide with the 
optimal plans for both the tenant and landlord, the linear programming 
method can give answers to questions such as, which leasing arrangement 
most nearly allows an efficient use of resources under various resource 
situations - main and collateral situations - or how efficient are typical 
share leases? This method has been used by Heady and Egbert (11). 
Tinssions and De Benedict is have introduced a modification which permits us 
to follow the intermediary positions between the landlord and tenant 
optima (5). 
It is important to note here that all the research models examined 
above assume free competition, certainty of price and yield expectations 
and a timeless analysis. It is convenient to carefully evaluate these 
assumptions. 
The first assumption implies that there is no collusion between buyers 
or sellers in the market and that the prices duly reflect the consumers' 
preferences. However, this assumption is not extended to the market 
imperfections arising from the leasing systems themselves. In certain 
cases either the landlord or the tenant have more bargaining power than 
the other. Consequently, the rent for land services, or the manner of 
sharing costs and returns can vary within certain limits. This situation 
existing between the landlord and tenant evidently has some elements of 
bilateral monopoly. It is also known that perfect competition is non­
existent in wide sectors of the American economy and that prices, in this 
era of production controls and subsidies, do not fully reflect consumers' 
choices,. Therefore, the pricing system does not always lead to an 
optimal allocation of resources.  ^
The second assumption is even more unrealistic in agriculture than 
the assumption of free competition. Price fluctuations causing uncertainty 
of expectations are common in the agricultural sector, in particular those 
affecting livestock. Yield uncertainties are particularly associated with 
crop enterprises. Stochastic rather than the deterministic models that 
have been mentioned could perhaps enhance accuracy and relevancy of 
analytical results. 
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However, even if the first two assumptions are not completely justi­
fied by factual experience, the conclusions obtained from the research 
using those assumptions are not unwarranted. The reason is that if the 
effect per se of leasing systems upon efficiency is studied, those effects 
have to be precisely isolated from the rest of the variables by keeping 
the latter fixed, Evidently, the ideal is to relax as much as possible 
the stringent assumptions. 
The third assumption regarding time can be justified only in the case 
of intra-temporal analysis of resource allocation. But if the effect over 
time of leasing systems on efficiency is investigated, it becomes evident 
that the same assumption would be completely invalid. 
Precisely, in this field of inter-temporal inefficiencies there is a 
serious gap in research. The reason may well be that dynamic models are 
relatively new in economics and they certainly are more complex, computa­
tionally, than the static ones. Some applications have been made to farm 
planning by using dynamic linear programming (20,26). However, there has 
been little research with regard to rented farms under different leasing 
arrangements, other than studies of a more delimiting character which have 
consisted of tabulations and simple statistical tests of the number of 
years of expected occupancy of tenants, the provisions for compensation 
for unexhausted resources in case of cessation of contract, percentage of 
written leases, etc. 
It is therefore apparent that a need exists for research which explores 
inter-temporal inefficiencies caused per se by leasing arrangements. In 
particular the impact of uncertainty of tenure due to short-term leases 
could be investigated. The condition for efficiency in a dynamic sense 
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is that the planning period of the tenant must coincide with the optimum 
planning horizon for products within the firm (34). In other words, the 
cultivator must have a lease covering a period of time that .permits him 
to realize all the expected returns from his investment or he must other­
wise be assured of compensation for his investment. The importance of the 
problem of limited planning horizon is illustrated by the data taken from 
a sample of 275 farms of Midwestern states shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Expected farm occupancy by tenure classes in four Midwestern 
states. 
Expected years of occupancy 
Tenure class 0 years 1 to 2 3 to 5 over 5 
Crop-share lease 13 53 47 58 
Livestock-share lease 5 19 38 42 
Total 18 72 85 100 
Percent of total 
operators 6.5 26.2 30.9 36.4 
Source: U. S. D.A. and North Central Regional Land Tenure Research 
Committee 
aIncludes 0 years and also no answer. 
It is clear that if more than 30 percent of the operators have a 
very short-term lease of two years or less without compensation clause, 
as is the case for most of them, then lease-engendered inter-temporal 
inefficiencies become serious. 
C. Objectives of This Study 
Having described the nature of the problem reviewed in previous 
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research, we come to the specific objectives of this study. These objec­
tives are: 
1. To develop a method of dynamic linear programming that permits 
the introduction of t years of activities and restrictions (t = 0, ..., n) 
in order to observe the effect of time on resource allocation on a rented 
farm under different leasing arrangements and also on one operated by the 
owner. 
2. To obtain optimal six-year plans, in an ex-ante sense for owner-
operators, landlords and tenants employing alternative levels of fertili­
zation, conservation and livestock investment in order to observe the pat­
tern of resource allocation through time. It is assumed that a six-year 
planning horizon is adequate. Furthermore, allowances are made for the 
amount of resources diverted from production by the family living on the 
farm. 
3. To obtain three optima and consecutive two-year plans covering 
the same period of time as the previous six-year programs. These plans 
should optimize returns to both the tenant and the landlord. 
4. To delineate and to measure the problematic areas created by inter­
temporal inefficiencies or dissociations within the lease by comparing the 
returns of the long-term plans and the short-term plans. Intra-temporal 
inefficiencies or dissociations will not be studied. In this respect the 
study complements the Timmons-Benedictis study mentioned earlier (5); and 
5. To identify the factors responsible in creating the gap between 
the ideal or norm and the actual situation, and also to investigate their 
behavior. 
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D. Methods and Procedures 
The procedure used to carry out the objectives of this study is com­
posed of three consecutive steps. The first step is a theoretical anal­
ysis of the dynamic theory of the firm. The need to examine the validity 
of firm theory assumptions when institutional factors such as leasing 
arrangements come into the picture is stressed. In particular, the assump­
tion of perfect association of benefits and costs in the person of the 
entrepreneur is questioned. Also a review of the main contributions to 
the theory of leasing systems is presented. From this analysis a set of 
hypotheses is obtained. These hypotheses will he tested in an empirical 
case situation. 
The second part is the elaboration of a dynamic model of linear 
programming. It will provide the framework within which inter-temporal 
inefficiencies or dissociations of benefits and costs on the leased farm 
may be studied. 
The third part consists of the analysis of the effects of crop-share 
leases upon the efficiency of resource allocation in the area chosen for 
the study - the Midwest. Crop-share leases are most numerous in that area. 
1. Area of study 
The farm selected for study is located in Fremont County in Southwest­
ern Iowa. The following procedure was used in selecting that farm. 
Bnpirical data of a comprehensive interstate survey on the relative effi­
ciencies of leasing systems were available. The survey was undertaken 
under the auspices of the North Central Regional Land Tenure Research 
Committee composed of 13 state agricultural experiment stations and the 
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Farm Foundation, by the United States Department of Agriculture and four 
cooperating states, Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska and Kansas, which are mem­
bers of the regional committee. The name "MINK" study, by which this 
survey will be referred in the remainder of this report, is derived from 
the first letters of the above four states. Ample information was avail­
able with regard to the physical, technical, economic and institutional 
conditions of the area covered by the study which comprised a relatively 
homogeneous section of the deep loess soils of Northwest Missouri, 
Southwest Iowa, Southeast Nebraska and Northeast Kansas. The Iowa sec­
tion of the MINK study included a sample of 201 farms in Fremont, Page, 
Montgomery, Mills and Pottawattamie Counties, all of them belonging to 
the Marshall Soil Association and having similar weather conditions and 
methods of farming. Table 2 shows the number of respondents to the MINK 
study survey by tenure class. 
Table 2. Number of respondents in the Iowa section of the MINK study by 
tenure class 
Tenure class Number 
Owner-operators 67 
Crop-share renters 77 
Livestock renters 57 
The information obtained from these farms provided criteria for the 
selection of a farm which, as far as possible, would be representative or 
typical in terms of soil type, farm size, amount of building space, ma­
chinery facilities, cropping enterprises, etc. Institutional restrictions 
taken from the MINK study have been incorporated in this research. 
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2. Source of data 
The large bulk of information regarding the institutional and other 
restrictions such as type of lease, level of capital and labor, livestock 
building space, machinery and equipment, etc., as expressed above, came 
from the Iowa section of the MINK project. The crop yield data were 
obtained from estimates made by the members of the Agronomy Department, 
Iowa State University, using three levels of fertilization - insufficient, 
low and high, and three levels of conservation - no conservation, contour­
ing and terracing, for each rotation and different type of land within the 
farm. The livestock input-output coefficients were obtained from the 
Animal Husbandry Department, Iowa State University. The terracing costs 
estimates were obtained from the Agricultural Engineering Department, 
Iowa State University. The prices of agricultural inputs and outputs were 
derived from the United States Department of Agriculture monthly reports. 
A simple expectation model, the mean value of the years 1955-1959, was 
developed as the operator's set of expectations for input and output 
prices. 
3. Analysis of data 
The ordinary linear programming technique - simplex method - is used 
to determine farm plans which will maximize returns both the tenant, land­
lord and owner-operator. The only novelty is that the number of activities 
or columns of the matrix, and the number of rows representing restrictions 
is highly increased. The reason is that activities or restrictions of 
different years are considered as altogether different activities. There­
fore, the problems can be handled only by an electronic computer. The use 
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of a-priori economic knowledge about the problems simplifies somewhat the 
computational complication. In this phase of the study, the Statistical 
Laboratory of Iowa State University has cooperated. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
A. The Hicksian Dynamics 
A firm is a decision-making unit. The entrepreneur decides the kinds 
and amounts of commodities he will produce, and the methods of production 
he will use. He transforms inputs into outputs according to the technical 
possibilities open to and recognized by him. He is responsible for his 
decisions and therefore obtains a profit or bears the loss from each part 
of the production process. 
A firm is in equilibrium when the entrepreneur has no reason to alter 
through time the production plan adopted, after having considered the 
input and output prices of the present and the price and technological 
expectations for the future. Static economic theory proposes certain con­
ditions for timeless equilibrium. Hicks adapts them to a dynamic frame­
work by defining a period of time, the "week", during which variations in 
prices are negligible.* He assumes that every individual has single-valued 
expectations of all relevant future prices.2 However, he does not neglect 
completely the uncertainty of expectations which ordinarily affects the 
planning agent at the moment of decision-making. In effect, for Hicks the 
representative price is- not the most probable price but rather the most 
probable price plus or minus an allowance for uncertainty (17, p. 124). 
He calls the latter "risk premium" and it is determined not only by the 
*He further assumes that in each period temporary equilibrium is 
easily reached in the market and that each individual possesses perfect 
contemporaneous knowledge of the prices. 
2This, of course, implies perfect competition. 
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planning agent's anticipations of future prices but also by his willing­
ness to take risks. Thus the entrepreneur's "certain expectations" are 
rather those which represent the state of uncertainty in which he makes 
his plans for the future. 
The entrepreneur, at the beginning of a particular period, establishes 
a production plan, viz. the amounts of inputs consumed and outputs pro­
duced during the n future periods (17).* Many alternatives or plans are 
open to the entrepreneur. Since in perfect competition his expectations 
are not related to a whole demand schedule but rather to a single price, 
the impact of the future upon the present behavior of the firm depends 
solely on the same entrepreneur's technological and price expectations. 
He can thus determine which plan is the most profitable. 
The entrepreneur will choose one production plan over the others 
according to a simple criterion, the present capitalized net value output 
of the chosen plan must be the greatest. Hicks defines the surplus of any 
planning period (week) as the amount by which the present value of output 
exceeds the present value of inputs. If interest rates and interest-
expectations are given, the total capitalized value of the n + 1 flow of 
surpluses is: 
r = n t = n 
c 
- 23 S < 0 prt xrt> 
 ^ r = 1 t = 0 
Where/S = \ and i is the rate of interest per week for loans of t 
' t 
"According to Hicks, an input is anything bought by the firm and an 
output anything sold. 
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weeks ; prt is the expected price of the r®"*1 product in the t^  week and 
xrt is the output of the r*"^  product for the tfc^  week. * 
Hicks, by considering outputs of different periods as different out­
puts, and inputs of different periods as different inputs and by using 
discounted prices for the same inputs and outputs, shows that the condi­
tions for equilibrium of the firm are the same in the dynamic case as in 
the static case. These conditions are three (17, p. 197): 
(1) The marginal rate of substitution between outputs of any two 
dates must equal the ratio of their discounted prices; 
(2) The marginal rate of substitution between inputs of any two dates 
must equal the ratio of their discounted prices; and 
(3) The marginal rate of transformation of any input into any output 
must equal the ratio of their discounted prices. 
These are necessary conditions but not sufficient. The sufficient or 
stability conditions are: 
(1) There must be an increasing marginal rate of substitution between 
outputs; 
(2) There must be a decreasing marginal rate of substitution between 
inputs; and 
(3) There must be a decreasing marginal rate of substitution of an 
input into an output. 
There is an additional dynamic condition that the present value of 
the flow of surpluses must be positive. This, as a side consideration, 
fixes the length of the planning period. 
*The price is discounted for risk as expressed above. 
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B. The Assumption of Perfect Association 
of Benefits and Costs 
From the above presentation, it is clear that the theory of the firm 
assumes perfect association of benefits and costs. In effect, the deci­
sion-making act and its consequences are attributable to the same person, 
the entrepreneur. This means that the input contributor receives a full 
share of the returns earned by each unit of resources he contributes. How­
ever, as Hicks himself acknowledges, the analysis of the firm is done 
"without inclusion of reference to institutional controls" (17, p. 7). 
These institutional controls will permit the agricultural firm, for 
instance, to take the form of an owner-operated farm, a leased farm, a 
corporation, a watershed or a vertical-integrated farm. Hick's assumption 
is a severe assumption and he defends it on the grounds that the study of 
economic institutions is better undertaken by methods other than economic. 
Institutions defined as "group control exercised on and in making and 
carrying out individual and group decisions" are the framework within 
which economic decisions are made or implemented (33, p. 169). Further­
more, they may have favorable or adverse effect on the outcome of individ­
ual actions. Therefore, they cannot be excluded when analyzing actual 
problems. Otherwise, theory may become a sort of intellectual exercise 
with little relevance to the problem studied. 
The assumption of perfect association of benefits and costs in the 
theory of the firm is warranted as long as institutional factors are 
excluded from the analysis. But if not excluded, the assumption may no 
longer hold. The case of the farm, which is the main interest of this 
pursuit, illustrates well the point. This assumption is justified for the 
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owner-operator who can attain optimum allocation of resources while 
maximizing his profits.'*' In a rented farm under customary leasing 
arrangements the situation is different. There resources are separately 
furnished by land-owner and tenant. The decision-making act is not in the 
hands of a single entrepreneur as the theory of the firm assumes. It is 
split between lessor and lessee, varying according to the type of lease 
and the relative bargaining power of each party. In practice, cash leases 
leave most of the decisions in the hands of the tenant. Crop-share leases 
permit the tenant to make some of the decisions and the landlord, others. 
Livestock leases tend to resemble a partnership between tenant and land­
lord. Consequently, the decision power belongs here to both landlord and 
tenant, although pending an agreement specific responsibilities are usually 
shared between them 
From the above it can be shown that perfect association of benefits 
of costs ordinarily does not exist in a rented farm. In effect, there 
are two types of dissociations conncected with leasing arrangements (29, 
p. 1178). The first occurs within a certain period of time. In economic 
terms, it is a short-run or intra-temporal dissociation. The second is 
one which comes about between individuals over several periods of time. 
It is called an inter-temporal dissociation.^  
M^aking allowances for inter-farm dissociations. An example of the 
latter: two adjoining farms in which one of the farmers causes flood and 
siltation damage to the other. 
%Both types of dissociations may occur either within a single firm 
or between firms. This study is concerned only with the first. 
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An example of intra-temporal dissociation is a leasing arrangement 
which permits the sharing of products between the landlord and tenant in 
a different proportion. Take for instance a hypothetical share-lease 
which stipulates that the sharing ratio for soybeans is 60-40 for the 
tenant and landlord and for corn is 50-50. If all costs are shared on a 
50-50 basis, the tenant will be stimulated to plant more land in soybeans 
since he can shift the costs to the landlord or, rather, he receives a 
higher share of soybean returns. 
A frequent inter-temporal dissociation on a rented farm is the one 
connected with short-term leases. Benefits arising from the tenant's 
investment in the farm are shifted over time to the landlord, after the 
lease expires, if there is no compensation provision in the lease. 
The above indicates the need to study the equilibrium conditions for 
the firm when a leasing arrangement is present. 
C. The Theory of Leasing Systems 
Additional conditions for equilibrium in the rented farm have been 
presented by Heady (9, 10). He defines the "perfect" or efficient lease as 
"one which allows the same farm plan to be most profitable for the landlord 
and the tenant; this plan should also be the one which is optimum for the 
farm as a whole" (13, p. 937).* Underlying this definition are the usual 
assumptions of perfect competition and that the price system is an adequate 
expression of consumer preference, and hence, an appropriate means of 
allocating resources in an efficient way. 
*An owner-operator with a large mortgage encumbrance could be less 
efficient than a tenant. Therefore, this is only a relatively perfect lease. 
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The above definition provides a starting point for setting conditions 
or rules by which leases can be judged under the point of view of farming 
efficiency. Hurlburt conveniently calls them "incentive conditions" 
because any lease must conform itself to them in order to encourage opera­
tions which will maximize income from the combined resources of tenant and 
landlord (19, p. 86). If these conditions are not realized two alterna­
tives are possible. Either, the landlord and tenant maximizing the 
resources contributed separately by each of them, will not jointly attain 
the same level of profits as when the same amount of resources are max­
imized under owner-operatorship, or, the farm will be operated at an 
optimum level of resources use, but with the presence of income trans­
fers from one resource owner to the other. 
The four incentive conditions are: 
1. "The share of the factor of variable input must be the same as 
the share of output of product obtained from it." An example will show 
why this condition must hold in order that the tenant or landlord invest 
the optimum amount of capital or other resources. Assuming that fertilizer 
is necessary for profitable corn production and that a 50-50 sharing of 
the product has been agreed to between the landlord and tenant, then a 
sharing of costs other than on a 50-50 basis changes for the tenant or 
landlord the level of most profitable application of fertilizer. If the 
tenant bears all the costs and only gets a half of the returns, he will 
apply fertilizer only until the marginal unit of input has equal value as 
the marginal unit of his share of corn. This results in less profits for 
the firm than would be the case if the tenant paid only half of the 
costs: no dissociations of benefits and costs could be then engendered 
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by the lease. 
2. "The shares of all products must be the same." In share leases, 
a differential share of products stimulates resource owners to maximize 
their own resources in such a way that either the landlord or the tenant 
will try to produce more of the crop of which he has a larger share. This 
will result in a lower total income than if the two crops were produced 
at the point where their marginal rate of transformation is equal to 
their price ratio. This evidently supposes that the two crops are com­
petitive although this condition also holds even if the crops are com­
plementary or supplementary (9, p. 601). 
3. "Each resource owner must receive the full share of the product 
earned by each unit of resource he, contributes." Equity, in an economic 
sense, implies that the input contributor receives a full share of the 
return earned by each unit of resources he contributes. This assures a 
perfect association of benefits and costs for the resource owner. The 
third incentive condition is nothing more than an application of the 
equity concept to the fixed and variables resources of landowner and ten-
1 
ant on a leased farm. A typical example of violation of this clause is 
the fact that living facilities are not separated from production facil­
ities and no specific rent is charged for them, or landlords, in certain 
crop-share leases, who contribute certain specific inputs for the 
tenant's livestock enterprise and do not get any returns for them. 
4. "Each resource owner must have an opportunity to receive return 
*The same reservations with regard to the concept of economic equity 
or justice are expressed here as in Chapter I. 
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on investment made in one production period but not forthcoming until a 
subsequent period." This fourth condition should be present in any lease 
in order to prevent inter-temporal dissociations within the firm. This 
implies that the tenant must have an optimum planning horizon or must be 
compensated for expected returns from any investment should he move before 
the total amount of returns is realized. Suppose a tenant wants to 
invest in equipment, buildings or conservation practices. If the lease 
term is long enough or if there is a compensation provision for unex­
hausted investments, then the renter will be stimulated to make those 
investments. 
In this connection, it is important to note, that not only invest­
ments will be deterred if the lease does not fulfill this condition, but 
also that the choice of enterprises opened to the tenant will be reduced. 
It is not logical to think that a tenant will get started in a new ven­
ture, say dairy, a long rotation or any other enterprise which needs 
special equipment or time to be built up, unless he possesses reasonable 
security of tenure over a period of years. Even if he could reasonably 
expect that in case of cessation of contract, he will be able to rent 
another farm in which he could continue that same enterprise, he is never 
quite sure that the new farm will have the same characteristics as the old 
one with regard to soil, weather, distance from the markets and many other 
imponderables. Therefore, he has to resign himself to undertake other 
enterprises which may be less profitable or less attractive. 
1. The "perfect" lease 
A lease which meets the four incentive conditions is called a "perfect" 
lease.1 This "perfect" lease is somewhat different from the prevalent 
concept of crop-sharing arrangements. In effect, in certain aspects and 
due mainly to the first condition requiring the sharing of costs as well 
as of returns between lessor and lessee, crop-share renting tends to 
acquire some of the characteristics of a partnership such as those which 
a livestock share-lease already possesses. In practice, what would be 
the significance of a change towards a "perfect" lease? If the latter 
becomes more widespread, it may have some psychological and legal conse­
quences , besides the expected economic effects. The tenant may be made 
liable for the losses incurred by the landlord and vice-versa. This could 
produce reluctance from the part of both parties to embark on such a 
venture. 
The tacit understanding that under a share-crop lease the tenant is " 
not liable for losses incurred by the landlord could be broken by the 
introduction of a perfect lease akin to partnership. Besides, a perfect 
lease which forces the landlord upon a sort of partnership extended through 
a relatively longer term of time (or, alternatively, upon a lease with 
some compensatory clause for tenant's investments) may possibly reduce his 
security of rent and property (2). In effect, according to the "perfect" 
lease requirement the landlord has to share in the variable costs incurred 
by the farm enterprise and consequently would be much more dependent on 
the tenant's ability -and integrity than under the customary crop-share 
lease. This also applies to the tenant with regard to the landlord. 
-^Perfect under the assumptions of this analysis. This does not mean 
that in all circumstances it is the best. 
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However, all the above does not obscure the merits of the "perfect" 
lease concept as an analytical tool in economics. It is not only a model 
or norm to which all leases should tend to imitate, at least, in some of 
their aspects, but also is a standard against which all leasing systems 
can be evaluated at least in bulk, i.e., in an unquantified way. 
2. Share-crop leases and cash leases 
A certain deal of controversy has been underway the past years 
related to the relative advantages of crop-share and cash leases. The 
supporters of the latter contend that cash leases automatically fulfill 
at least the first two incentive conditions whereas crop-share leases, as 
has been empirically established by Hurlburt and others, are far from meet­
ing all the requirements of the "perfect" lease (13, 19, 23, 31). 
Others argue, saying that even if cash-leases do fulfill the first 
two conditions they present other disadvantages. In particular, they may 
violate the third condition: the cash rental payment may not correspond 
to the marginal productivity of land. Furthermore, cash leases may produce 
more risk and uncertainty of the future. Contrariwise to crop-share farm­
ing, the commitment of a large and fixed rent remains unaltered, even in 
the case of poor yields. 
Another disadvantage of cash leases lies in the fact that they tend to 
encourage the depletion of the soil fertility. The landlord, in case of 
better crops, does not get any part of the increased yields. The tenant is 
thus encouraged to deplete the farm without caring about the future conse­
quences for his successor. In this case there is a violation of the fourth 
condition. 
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The question about the relative merits of share and cash leases is 
difficult to settle. Undoubtedly, there are advantages and disadvantages 
associated with the two types of leases. Perhaps both of them could be 
advocated according to the types of farming, geographical situation, 
expectations for the future and many other factors. This is hardly the 
positions of certain authors who deny that the "perfect" lease, as under­
stood by Heady, is possible. Their argument is that sharing costs in the 
same way as the product tends to create at most an imperfect partnership, 
which is not adapted to the aspirations and abilities of most landlords 
and tenants (2, p. 6). 
This line of thought has some basis for its support as seen above. 
However, the fact that the livestock lease, also very much akin to a 
partnership, is quite widespread in many regions invalidates the universal­
ity of the objection. If there are farmers and tenants willing to join 
resources in a livestock-share lease, it is also possible to conceive that 
the "perfect" lease could be implemented on cash-grain farms. The main 
difficulty lies in the removal of defective customary arrangements which, 
as many other institutional forces, may have an adverse effect on economic 
efficiency. 
D. Certain Dynamic Implications of the 
Incentive Conditions 
1. Condition three and the basis of sharing 
Perhaps it has not been stressed sufficiently that condition three 
also applies to the fixed contributions of the landlord, i.e., land and 
buildings, and the tenant, i.e., labor and machinery.^  The fixed resources 
contributed by both parties should determine the basis of sharing used in 
the lease, and not, as is frequently done, the traditional ratio which is 
customary in the area. Take as an example the 50-50 share of crops so 
widespread in the Midwest. Up to what extent is it justified? It may 
have been equitable some time in the past but this does not assure that 
today it is adjusted to the value of the land, machinery and labor. The 
relative prices of those factors of production may change through time 
thus demanding a constant readjustment of the basis of sharing between 
landlord and tenant. 
A periodical valuation of their resources and a negotiation on the 
proportion of returns going to each party is required. The ratio of the 
landlord's and tenant's fixed contribution to the contract should determine 
the ratio of sharing, which need not necessarily be 50-50 or any other 
specific ratio. 
Undoubtedly, this would bring about some problems of valuation (20). 
Some conflicts between lessee and lessor may arise during the bargaining 
process as it has been suggested by some authors (18). But once an agree­
ment is reached, this would provide more incentive to farm in an efficient 
way since the arrangement should be satisfactory to both parties. In this 
field of fixed resources, there is need, undoubtedly, for more research. 
2. The fourth incentive condition: an example 
It is necessary to proceed further in the analysis of the fourth 
I 
Ifhe farm is under a crop-share lease. Note that labor is considered 
as a fixed resource. 
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condition, since it constitutes the core of this research. A hypothetical 
example will be used for this purpose. Suppose a tenant who would like to 
use some conservation practices such as terracing. The landlord, however, 
does not want to bear all the costs of them, which are $7.00 per acre 
payable on year t=0.* They finally agree on sharing; costs on a 50-50 
basis, since the crops are shared in the same way. The increase in yield, 
dus to terracing, per acre of continuous corn is assumed to be 3 bushels 
and the price of corn $1.10 per bushel. The terraces are supposed to last 
10 years and do not need any maintenance expense. Table 3 shows the 
present capitalized values of added yearly returns and the respective 
shares going to landlord and tenant. The present capitalized value of the 
9 
yearly cost is also presented. 
Now assume that the tenant has only a 5 year contract without compen­
sation provisions and therefore a guaranteed planning horizon of only five 
O 
years. However, the optimum planning horizon has a length of 10 years. 
The tenant is encountered with one of three alternatives. If the 
lease contains no compensation clause for investments yielding returns 
beyond the tenant's planning horizon, there will be a dissociation of 
benefits and costs. The tenant will not receive the expected added 
returns of the last five years. The present capitalized value of these 
•'•The Federal Government bears 70% of the costs. 
An interest rate of 5% is assumed. 
3After the tenth year, the returns added every year become zero thus 
setting the lower limit of the optimum planning horizon. 
Table 3. Capitalized value of added returns per acre resulting from investment in terracing. 
Capitalized Capitalized Capitalized value 
Yield value of Added value of of shares of 
differential yearly costs returns added returns added returns 
Year bu. per acre $ per acre $ per acre $ per acre $ per acre 
0 3 .35 3.30' 3.30 1.65 
1 3 • .35 3.30 3.14 1.57 
2 3 .35 3.30 2.99 1.50 
3 3 .35 3.30 2.85 1.42 
4 3 .35 3.30 2.71 1.36 
5 3 .35 3.30 2.58 1.29 
6 3 .35 3.30 2.46 1.23 
7 3 .35 3.30 2.34 1.17 
8 3 .35 3.30 2.23 1.12 
9 3 .35 3.30 2.13 1.06 
10 0 0.00 0 0 0 
32 
expected returns is $5.87 per acre and it is represented in Figure 1-A 
by the shaded area. 
The second possibility is that the lease contains a compensation 
clause for unexhausted investments. But it only covers the costs of 
those investments. From years 6 through 10, the capitalized value of 
yearly costs amounts to $1.75 per acre. The capitalized value of the 
yearly additional returns is $5.87 per acre. Evidently this type of 
compensatory clause does not suppress all inefficiencies because there 
is still a dissociation of benefits and costs in the person of the ten­
ant. The landlord receives returns from resources which he did not con­
tribute. This amounts to $4.12 per acre of capitalized value as shown 
in Figure 1-B. Consequently, the tenant is still not fully stimulated 
to make that investment. 
Finally, the third possibility open to the tenant and the one in 
full agreement with the fourth incentive condition, is that the tenant 
be compensated for the potential earnings of his inexhausted investments. 
In this case, there is a perfect association of benefits and costs since 
the tenant receives all the returns attributable -to each unit of 
resource. He will be, with regard to incentives to invest, on an equal 
standing with the landlord and the owner-operator. 
3. The second incentive condition: a qualification 
The incentive conditions have been generally used in a static frame­
work. It is then pertinent to ask whether, if transposed to a dynamic 
framework, they could be useful or not. It looks obvious that the first 
and third condition dealing with intra-temporal efficiency are unaltered 
Figure 1. Inter-temporal dissociations in leases with no compensatory 
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if time is brought into the picture. 
Condition four, being nothing but an explicit extension of condition 
three over time, is most appropriate in dynamic analysis. The only one 
remaining is condition two which states that the share of all products 
between landlord and tenant must be the same. This means, in dynamic 
terms, that not only all products should be shared on an equal proportion 
on year t=0 but also through year n , until the lease expires. 
This might sound as a truism. However, if all products are shared 
in the same proportion, this does not mean that the proportion of them 
going to tenant and landlord must remain unchanged until the expiration 
of the contract. It could change every year, provided that within each 
year, all the products be shared on the same basis. This, conceivably, 
could have some importance. In effect, one of the social functions of 
leases is to help beginning farmers to get started. It has been argued 
that it is not very effective nowadays in the United States because tech­
nological progress requires from farmers an enlarged investment on 
machinery and equipment. It is therefore very difficult for young opera­
tors with low equity to establish themselves on a farm. For that reason, 
leases with flexible and adjustable sharing proportion between landlord 
and tenant have been advocated (18). 
Suppose that the first year the landlord and tenant share on a 65-35 
basis, the following year on a 60-40 basis and finally, as the tenant's 
capital is building up, and is re-invested in machinery (crop-share lease) 
or livestock (livestock-share lease), the sharing ratio between lessor and 
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lessee could tend toward the 50-50 ratio.* Of course, other alternatives 
besides leases with adjustable sharing proportions are possible. For in­
stance, beginners could start renting small farms and as their net worth 
increases, they could rent additional tracts of land in the vicinity, or, 
even move to larger farms. 
E. The Method of Inquiry and Its Relation to Theory 
At this point it becomes relevant to evaluate the theory of leasing 
in relation to the purposes of this study. This theory has provided us 
with a norm or standard of efficiency. Attention can now be turned to 
the actual situation. Customary leases fall short of the norm or standard. 
The presence of a gap can be detected by investigating whether or not the 
different leases meet the four incentive conditions. The answers given 
by several empirical and mostly descriptive studies are clear (2, 19, 2 9 ) .  
Most of the customary leases violate one or more of the incentive condi­
tions. These empirical studies, however, give an answer in bulk rather than 
in precise terms. These studies do not measure in quantitative terms 
the gap due to lease engendered inefficiencies; they rather indicate its 
existence. 
1. Leasing systems and single equation models 
Others have endeavored to measure those inefficiencies by resorting 
to productivity analysis. Single equation models are used to determine 
the over-all efficiency of existing leasing arrangements and also relative 
1 
Assuming that the basis of sharing is the equitable one under the 
specific circumstances surrounding the lease studied. 
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efficiencies. A measure of the latter is obtained by deriving production 
functions for groups of farms which have common tenure characteristics. 
These functions can then be tested to detect significant differences in 
productivity between groups. If any significant difference between two 
groups of tenure is found, it is inferred that there are tenure factors 
engendering inefficiencies in resource allocation. 
However, the single equation models employed to estimate tenure 
parameters have serious shortcomings. It is impossible to derive from 
empirical data a production function corresponding exactly to the produc­
tion function provided by economic theory. There are several reasons. The 
aggregation of inputs and outputs presents a serious problem (26). Like­
wise, the non-inclusion of certain variables like management into the 
production function may cause a severe upward bias in the capital input 
elasticity (7). The reason is that capital and managerial ability may 
be highly correlated in the agricultural firm. The failure to introduce 
quality differentials in the labor input may produce downward biases in 
the latter1s elasticity. Furthermore, the fact that inter-firm data is 
used to provide an intra-firm function questions the validity of recommend­
ations for farm management and policy based on production functions like 
the Cobb-Douglas function (3, 25). 
It is true that the heterogeneity of farm samples could be somewhat 
reduced by careful sampling (23). Also, the management problem could be 
decreased by selecting a sample of farms which show similar managerial 
inputs or by the introduction of a management index. Likewise, inputs 
and outputs could be carefully aggregated. But as long as the above 
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improvements are not developed, Cobb-Douglas results should be accepted 
with extreme caution.* As of now, these results give some clues about 
the specific effect of leasing structures on resource allocation rather 
than precise answers. 
2. Leasing systems research and linear programming 
The introduction of linear programming into tenure research may be 
due to the limitations found in the value product analysis. As stated 
before, these two techniques are not substitutes for each other but 
rather they are supplementary. The main difference is that linear program 
is applied to individual cases and has a normative character whereas 
production functions attempt to give an over-all efficiency estimate of 
actual farming situations. 
Is it possible for linear programming to provide precise answers to 
the question of lease-engendered inefficiencies? Economic theory supplies 
a norm which should be followed, i.e., that the optimum plan for the 
tenant and the landlord should be the same and that those two plans should 
be the same as that for the farm as a whole. The owner-operated farm 
becomes then the norm for testing other tenure arrangements. The reason 
is that the owner provides the resources and obtains the returns thereof. 
There is perfect association of benefits and costs in his person. How­
ever, the owner-operator must be debt-free because if he bears a heavy 
encumbrance he even could be less efficient than a tenant with adequate 
*A11 along it has been assumed that statistical problems associated 
with the derivation of production functions have been conveniently 
solved (34, Chapter V). 
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capital availability. 
The "perfect" leasing arrangement which permits all profits to be 
associated with costs should also be as efficient as owner-operatorship. 
There are only two ways in which leasing arrangements can affect the 
level of profits of the optimum plan. One is through the technical 
coefficients of production, prices and resource restrictions which belong 
to a particular farm situation. The other is through cost and income 
arrangements which affect the revenue received by lessor and lessee. 
However, input-output coefficients, prices and resource restrictions 
can be maintained at the same fixed level while programming the owner-
operator and "perfect" lease plans.* Then, under the usual assumptions, 
there is no theoretical reason to expect that the optimum plan for the 
owner-operator should not be the same as that for a farm under a "perfect" 
leasing arrangement, i.e., one which meets all the incentive conditions. 
Having obtained the norm, a farm can then be programmed under dif­
ferent tenure arrangements. If the level of profits is different between 
the two plans, the difference can be attributed per se to leasing arrange­
ments. There are two types of lease-engendered inefficiencies: those 
caused by intra-temporal and those of inter-temporal dissociations. 
Intra-temporal inefficiencies can be isolated by programming a farm, 
within one period of time, under the customary sharing agreements of any 
lease type. Then the optimum plan is compared to the owner-operator's 
optimum plan or to the "perfect" lease plan. In both cases static linear 
*It will be seen below that this is not possible for crop-share rented 
farms in the case of the capital resource. 
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is used. 
Inter-temporal inefficiencies in resource allocation are detected 
in a similar way. First, the optimum enterprise combination is obtained 
by using dynamic programming for a certain number of years. The length 
of period chosen, i.e., the number of years, is assumed to be adequate in 
the sense that it would assure perfect association of costs and benefits 
in the person of the tenant. This first plan is for a farm operated 
under a "perfect" leasing arrangement. 
Second, the farm is programmed for the same number of years but now 
under the sharing provisions of the leasing system which is investigated. 
If there is a difference in profits between the renter's plan and the 
"perfect lease" plan, this difference is attributed to intra-temporal 
inefficiencies. The difference is the sum of the inefficiencies within 
each discrete period of time. 
Third, in order to trace the malallocation of resources engendered 
by a lease through time, a series of consecutive plans, covering the same 
period of years as the long-run plan under a "perfect" leasing arrangement 
or norm, must be programmed. These consecutive plans are for a tenant 
under a "perfect" intra-temporal leasing arrangement but under a rela­
tively short planning horizon. This means that the lease fulfills con­
ditions one to three but that it violates condition four. By comparing 
the long-term plan with adequate planning horizon, the norm, with the con­
secutive series of plans with inadequate planning horizon, inter-temporal 
inefficiencies in resource allocation due per se to leasing systems are 
isolated. If there are such inefficiencies, the norm and the set of 
41 
short-term plans will lead to a different combination of enterprises over 
time and profits of the first will be greater than the sum of profits of 
the short-term plans. 
Evidently, also inter-temporal inefficiencies due to leasing systems 
could be found by running another series of consecutive plans for tenants 
with limited planning horizon and under customary leasing arrangements. 
The difference in profits between the long-term share-rented farm plan 
under customary arrangements and these plans could be attributed per se 
to inter-temporal lease-engendered inefficiencies. This study will 
mostly follow this last procedure to detect inter-temporal inefficiencies. 
It is important to emphasize here that the norm used in this study 
is no more the owner-operator's long term plan but rather the crop-share 
renter's long term farm plan. This is a departure from previous empiri­
cal studies using linear programming (6, 13). The reason is that in a 
dynamic framework it is not possible to set the owner-operator's and the 
crop-share renter's plans at the same level of capital. Consequently 
those two plans cannot be compared in order to detect inefficiencies due 
per se to the leasing arrangement. 
In the first year the owner-operator's level of capital can, of 
course, be equal to the sum of the landlord and tenant capital on a 
share-rented farm. The allocation of that capital will take a different 
form in the two cases, however. In effect, the crop-share renter is not 
free as the owner-operator to use the total amount of capital available 
to him, i.e., his part and that contributed by the landlord, in any way 
he wants. The landlord's capital is only available for investment in 
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crop activities and not in livestock activities.1 
If the rate of return from crop and livestock activities is different 
the first year capital resources will be allocated differently on an 
owner-operated farm and on a crop-share rented farm. Hence, the returns 
at the end of the year will be different in the two cases. Since these 
returns or a part thereof become the capital input for the second year the 
capital available in the second year, and in later years, is going to 
differ in an owner-operated farm and a crop-share farm. It can be con­
cluded that optima dynamic plans for an owner-operator and a crop-share 
rented farm cannot be usefully compared in measuring inter-temporal 
2 inefficiencies due to crop-share leasing arrangements. 
3. Interpretation of results from linear programming 
In answer to the question posed at the beginning of the previous 
section it can now be said in theory, linear programming can give a satis­
factory measure of malallocation of resources caused per se by leasing 
systems. In this sense, linear programming offers advantages over produc­
tion functions. However, it is important to keep is mind that the linear 
programming technique is constrained by its very nature to give results 
which are not .universal in its extension. They apply to particular 
situations and do not give more general measurements of inefficiencies as 
*In reality all crop-share leases violate the second incentive condi­
tion which says that the share of all products between landlord and tenant 
must be the same. The livestock activities are shared on a different 
basis than the crop activities in customary crop-shass arrangements in the 
Middlewest. 
2 
This is not the case of a livestock lease in which both crop and live­
stock activities costs and returns are shared by landlord and tenant. 
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production function attempts to do. 
For instance, the reduction in landlord and tenant income which is 
the measure of the inefficiency of a particular leasing arrangement has 
the following interpretation: It applies only to farms which have a 
specific amount and type of resources, with a certain type of management; 
it is restricted to a particular set of technical coefficients of produc­
tion; it is also dependent on the price relationships used, i.e., on the 
expectation model assumed for the farmer. 
Evidently, if all these factors kept constant, while obtaining a 
certain optimum, are permitted to vary, the results obtained could also 
vary considerably. 
It is true that certain refinements can be introduced into the tech­
nique in order to use variable prices for some activities and also variable 
levels of certain resources, but this does not essentially alter the fact 
that linear programming deals with particular situations. 
To obtain a more general measure of efficiency by this method, a 
very extended research covering most of the typical farm situations in 
different soil areas would be necessary. This implies the availability 
of great amounts of research funds. Given the present computational 
techniques and the costs of research, the possibilities of a large 
scale project of that type do not look very bright. 
It can be concluded that linear programming is a very useful tech­
nique in land tenure research. It can provide a measure of efficiency, 
which, although applied only to particular cases, nevertheless is more 
satisfactory with regard to reliability of results than other known 
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techniques. 
It is in the area of inter-temporal inefficiencies due per se to 
leasing systems where the dynamic programming technique can be applied 
to great advantage. The reason is that there is a considerable gap in 
research. Dynamic programming has been applied to management and house­
hold planning rather than to tenure problems (24, 28). It is precisely 
the purpose of this inquiry to make an empirical study of the inter-tem­
poral inefficiencies in leasing arrangements. 
F. Hypotheses Guiding This Study 
The above presentation of the theory of leasing in its relation to 
dynamic linear programming had the following purpose: to provide us with 
the necessary elements to formulate the theoretical hypotheses which will 
guide the empirical research. 
1. Inadequate planning horizon engendering uncertainty of tenure, caused 
by short-term leasing arrangements, produce an inefficient inter-temporal 
resource allocation and affect the nature of profitable investment. 
Inefficiency is revealed through a lower level of returns for the firm 
under short-term customary leasing arrangements than the one attainable 
under the same leasing arrangements but with adequate planning horizon 
for the tenant. 
2. Short-term leases affect the rate of the investment of the tenant in 
fertilizer and lime, buildings and equipment, and conservation practices. 
Uncertainty of tenure may also produce malallocation of resources by 
limiting the number of enterprises eligible for the tenant. 
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3. Capital resources have an important role in the inter-temporal 
allocation of resources. The relationships between the restrictions in 
the amount of landlord's and tenant's capital and the sharing of costs 
and returns have also an impact on the rate of investment of the tenant 
in fertilizer, buildings and equipment, and in the use of terracing. 
4. In a lease characterized by customary sharing of benefits and costs 
an increase in efficiency could be obtained by: (a) adequate planning 
horizon assured by longer-term leases or in its defect by provisions of 
compensatory payments to the tenant according to the earning power of 
his unexhausted resources, in case of short-term leases or cessation of 
contract; (b) modification in the quantity of capital contributed by the 
landlord and tenant; (c) modification, in the quantity of resources con­
tributed by the two parties and in the sharing of products between them. 
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III. FORMULATION OF A MODEL 
A. The Dynamic Linear Programming Technique 
In the last few years empirical studies have been made to determine 
optima farm plans over a period of years (23,27). These plans have 
restrictions imposed by limited availability of fixed and variable re­
sources and a yearly allowance for household consumption of the operator 
and his family. Capital available in a limited amount the first year is 
permitted to grow in subsequent years by reinvesting in the firm the 
annual returns. In a similar way, outputs of certain activities in a 
year become inputs in the following year. Thus, activities in each of 
the total number of years covered by the plan are interrelated. 
1. Dynamic linear programming 
The technique called dynamic linear programming allows maximizing 
the returns (or any other choice criterion) from activities or enterprises 
for k discrete period of years (k = 9,1, ..., t) subject to restrictions 
\ 
in the availability of resources in all the k years (1, 5, 32). 
f (X) = c1 . x = max. (1) 
Let f(X) be the objective function which is maximized. It may repre­
sent gross returns, output or net returns of a firm. The element c . of 
JK 
the column vector of order n is the present discounted value of c^ , the 
price or return of the j*"*1 activity in the k^ year, and x^  of the program 
T^he usual assumptions of static linear programming hold also for dyna­
mic programming: linearity (production coefficients are constant; additiv-
ity (no interaction between different resources); finiteness (number of 
activities is not infinite); and, divisibility of inputs and outputs. 
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or activity vector x of order n is the level of the j1"*1 economic activity 
in the k'*1 year. 
A . x < b (2) 
The matrix of inequalities A of order m x n is composed of the fixed 
input-output coefficients. Its element a. . has three subscripts. 
I 
fch 
The subscript i denotes the i restriction or row (i=l,2,... ,m); the 
subscript j symbolizes the j4"*1 activity (j = l,2,...,t). 
The element b^  of the column vector b of order m represents the 
quantity available of the i*"^  resource in the k^  year. 
Each economic restriction is obviously subject to the condition of 
non-negativity: 
x > 0 (3) 
In order to get rid of the m inequalities a column vector y of m 
components or slack variables is introduced. The inequalities are thus 
transformed into equalities. 
Let z be a new activity vector of order m + n: 
z = [ y ]  ( 4 )  
and B a new matrix of order m (m + n) 
B = [A I j (5) 
where I is the unit matrix of order mxm. 
A new vector d is also defined: 
d =[o] (6) 
where 0 is a column vector of m components corresponding to the slack 
variables. These m components are all zero. 
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a new objective function is maximized: 
g(Z) = d1 . z = max. (7) 
under the restrictions imposed by the resource availability 
B . z = b (8) 
and the non-negativity condition for economic activities 
z > 0 (9) 
Apparently this model does not differ from the standard static model 
of linear programming. The difference lies in the interpretation of the 
column vector c. Its n components are no longer the prices or returns 
from the n activities of one period of time but rather the present value 
of discounted prices or returns of all the k years included in the plan. 
Therefore, this model makes use of comparative statics or dynamics in 
the Hicksian sense. 
Hicks assumes that the entrepreneur makes a production plan for t 
periods, that inputs and outputs of different periods are altogether 
different inputs and outputs, that the technological coefficients may 
change from year to year and also that prices of inputs and outputs may 
change. The latter assumption has the qualification that the entrepreneur 
has single-valued expectations discounted for uncertainty. All the above 
assumptions can be incorporated into the dynamic model of linear program­
ming.* 
The ends-in-view of the farmer over time and the possible means of 
*We must not forget, of course, that linear programming is not deal­
ing with continuous production functions and that it assumes constant 
returns to scale. 
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observing them will be considered. It will then become possible to build 
a reasonably realistic model which takes account of these two factors. 
B. The Agricultural Firm Over Time: Ends and Means 
1. Ends-in-view of the farmer 
Let us consider an agricultural firm such as an owner-operated or 
a leased farm. It can be assumed that the farmer and his family live on 
the farm. Under these circumstances the farmer has two main long term 
ends-in-view: the increasement of his net worth over time, and a guaranteed 
minimum level of annual family consumption.* These two goals are related 
in a competitive way. Figure 2 shows a transformation curve for a fixed 
level of resources. The vertical axis indicates the units of resources 
diverted for family living and the horizontal axis the units of resources 
used in the production process. 
Family living is considered to have precedence, up to a specified 
limit, over increase in the farmer's net worth. A minimum of consumption 
is needed for the survival of the farmer and his family. Therefore, 
production will never divert resources from consumption beyond the point 
of minimal consumption. At that point the rate of substitution of con­
sumption for production in the farmer's preference becomes infinity. This 
is shown in Figure 2 by the shape of the series of indifference curves 
IC. They approach asymptotically a line indicating the minimum level of 
consumption. 
*Other long term goals could be considered such as additional leisure. 
However, this study will be restricted to these two goals which seem 
reasonable. 







or (TT ^ o. tth 
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Above the minimum level of consumption, consumption and production 
compete for the available resources. It is assumed that the preferences 
of the farmer are a function of the level of annual income. The shape of 
the indifference curves IC hypothesizes that as income increases the 
farmer prefers to divert relatively more resources from production. 
2. Means to achieve the ends-in-view 
There are means open to the farmer to achieve the two ends he seeks. 
In order to transform inputs into outputs he needs to acquire control of 
resources. This may be by one of three ways: by reinvesting his net worth; 
by borrowing capital; or by pooling his own resource, with other persons. 
Leasing arrangements are an example of the latter. 
However, another means is also available to the farmer to achieve his 
objectives. This may be by investing not in his farm but in external 
enterprises. For instance, the farmer can invest in stockshares, bonds, 
savings accounts, or in any business enterprise. 
Consequently, the entrepreneur after having met his consumption 
preferences each year may invest part of his returns in the farm and 
part in some external investment. 
Perhaps the previous ideas can be expressed better by means of a 
single diagram as in Figure 3A. It represents the decision-making unit 
in the year k=0. The farmer has a given amount of resources coming from 
the three sources mentioned above. The resources in the year k=0 are 
channelled according to the preferences of the entrepreneur into three 
directions: family consumption, reinvestment in the farm and external 
investment. 
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The situation in year k=l is somewhat different as shown in Figure 
3 B. There are now four sources or ways of acquiring control over re­
sources: 1) from previous year's returns of the farm enterprise; 2) from 
returns of external investment; 3) from borrowed money; and 4) by pooling 
resources with a second party in a leasing arrangement or partnership. 
Again the entrepreneur controlling a bundle of resources will have 
to make a choice between consumption and investment in the farm or in an 
external enterprise. As annual income increases it may happen that family 
consumption increases above the minimum needed for the necessities of 
life. Therefore, more resources may be diverted from production for 
family consumption in year 1 than in year 0. 
C. A General Dynamic Model of an Agricultural Firm 
Having stated above the ends-in-view over time of farmers and the 
means to implement them, the question arises of how these ends and means 
can be expressed in a programming model. From the nature of linear pro­
gramming it is known that ends are expressed in the objective function and 
means by the different economic activities. 
1. The objective function ~ 
When the static linear programming is applied to agricultural problems 
it usually maximizes net returns in money terms. That is, the components 
of the vector d in (7) are the net prices of activities or the difference 
between total returns obtained from a unit of activity and variable 
capital expense per unit of activity. 
It is convenient to examine the significance of maximisation of net 
returns. These are defined as: 
Figure 3. Allocation of resources in year 0 and 1 in an agricultural 
firm 
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N.R. = T.R. - T.C. (10) 
where T.R. is total returns and T.C. total costs. 
If the right hand side of equality (9) is examined, it can be seen 
that net returns in the linear programming context have a different mean­
ing than in economic theory. In effect T.R. are attributable to all 
fixed and variable resources which a firm transforms into output. However, 
T.C. consists only of yearly cash outlay. In the linear programming 
approach T.C. evidently excludes all costs originating from resources 
other than capital such as labor, management and fixed resources. 
It can then be concluded that in the standard programming approach 
maximization of "net returns" is rather misleading because only cash 
costs are accounted for. All other resources, fixed and variable, are 
taken as given and they constitute the restrictions under which net 
returns are maximized. Therefore, "net returns" in that context is a 
misnomer. It should rather be "net returns above variable capital 
expense." 
It could be argued that a matter of names is not very important if 
the idea behind the names is correct. However, for our purposes, neither 
the concept or the terminology is quite correct. The ends to be maximized 
in this model are the increase of net worth of the farmer, allowing for a 
satisfactory family consumption. Maximization of discounted annual net 
returns is not completely consistent with those ends.* 
In effect, a farmer having those ends-in-view when planning for the 
*We will see later, however, that under certain conditions the 
optimum feasible solution for programs maximizing net returns and gross 
returns allows for the same allocation of resources. 
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future will not be concerned with maximizing the net returns of every 
year included in the plan. What he wants to emphasize is growth of his 
net worth over time. Therefore, after providing for family consumption, 
he will rather maximize his capital resources available at the end of the 
terminal planning year. That is, he will maximize total money returns 
of year k=t. 
Therefore, the objective function is as (7) 
g(Z) = d' . z 
subject as before to conditions (8) and (9), where g(Z) is now total money 
returns of the firm. The element d., , of the vector d is the present cap-
JK 
italized value of d., , the expected gross return in money terms or ex-
JK 
pected market price of the j activity in the k year. 
There are additional conditions to meet in this model. Only total 
returns of the last year, t, are maximized, because prices of all activ­
ities in any year k=t are equal to zero. In matrix notation: 
djk = 0 , k = t (11) 
and 
djk > 0 , k = t (12) 
The advantages brought by this objective function over the standard 
one used in other studies are twofold. First, it avoids the pitfall of 
using the name "net returns" in an equivocal sense. Second, it conforms 
with the ends-in-view sought by agricultural entrepreneurs over time. 
Our model departs from Hicks in that his entrepreneur maximizes net 
returns of every year whereas our farmer maximizes gross returns of the 
terminal year of his plan. Our model is better adapted to meet the goals 
58 
of an agricultural firm, more precisely of an owner-operated or rented 
farm. 
If closer look is taken at the objectives sought by the Hicksian 
entrepreneur a further difference is found. Hicks' entrepreneur maximizes 
the Income surpluses over time, but that income is not reinvested in the 
firm or in an exterior concern. This shows that Hicks analysis is 
reduced to only the first of the three alternatives shown in Figure 3. 
Our model also differs from the Heady models (23, 27) in that his 
farmer has only two choices open to him: he can consume part of the income 
surpluses and the rest has to be forcedly reinvested in the farm. In 
terms of Figure 3 it can be seen that these models make use of the first 
two alternatives. No exterior investment is considered in thesè models. 
Our model brings more flexibility by permitting more alternatives. The 
goals sought by our farmer, that is, the increase of his net worth over 
time after having met the minimal family consumption, appear more realis­
tic than the goals in the Heady model. It is more difficult to conceive a 
farmer planning for the future maximizing net returns each year and less 
concerned with the increase of his capital resources. 
In reality the two objective functions, net returns and total returns 
of the terminal year of the planning period, represent a choice between 
the immediate versus the future. In some cases this choice has no parti­
cular impact on allocation of farm resources. In effect, if the internal 
rate of growth of the firm is greater than the external rate of growth, 
i.e., represented by the rate of interest obtained by bonds or the rate of 
returns from exterior enterprises, then maximization of returns from 
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activities of each year included in the plan becomes complementary with 
maximization of the returns of the terminal year. But also maximization 
of the alternative objective functions may become competitive and then the 
allocation of resources will be different when maximizing each function. 
This may happen when the external rate of growth (of capital) is greater 
than the internal rate of growth.* Then allocating resources in order 
to maximize returns in the first years of a long-term plan will decrease 
the returns of the last years and vice-versa. 
The difference between the two objective functions can be illustrated 
algebraically. Let the left hand side of (13) be the sum of net returns 
2 
of a two-year plan and the right hand side the total returns of the last 
year: 
I(XilRil)-Z <XilCll> + Z<Xi28i2>9-I<Xi2Cl2>0 £<Xi2Ri2) <13> 
where X^ i^s the level of the inactivity £n the kth year, is the market 
price of the product of the inactivity in the k^  year, C^ is the cap­
ital requirement of the i^  activity in the k*"^ year and @ is the discount 
th factor in the k year. 
In order that the left hand and right hand side of (13) becomes an 
equality by maximizing them, two conditions have to be met. 
First, the capital available in year 1 must be a fixed amount and 
nothing of it can be left unused or in disposal in the optimum plan: 
"Sîhen we talk of the external rate of growth and the internal rate 
of growth we mean expected rates of growth. Evidently, the external 
rate of growth is expressed through the discount factor /S used in obtain­
ing the present value of returns. Likewise it is expressed by the rate 
of return of the capital selling activities. 
2 
This reasoning can be extended to any number of years. 
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= % (14) 
Second, the discount factor £ must approach one, that is, the 
interest rate for external investment must be low. 
If these two conditions are met and since total returns of one year 
are equivalent to the capital supply of the following year, (13) becomes : 
lanRa(l-0 ) - K + I(Xi2Ri2) - £(Xi2Ri2) (15) 
where the first term becomes zero as /3 tends to 1. Under these condi­
tions maximizing the sum of discounted net returns and maximizing dis­
counted total returns of the last year, i.e., taking the derivative of 
(15), produces the same allocation of resources in the optimal plans for 
the two different objective functions. 
What evidently differs in maximizing the two alternative objective 
rows is the level of returns of the optimal feasible solution. Gross 
returns of the last year could only by chance be equal to the sum of net 
returns of the t years included in the plan. 
It is important to remark here that if the two conditions stated 
above are met, the optimal plan maximizing total returns of the terminal 
planning year is an efficient one. That is, the results obtained by linear 
programming are consistent with the equilibrium conditions for the firm as 
given by economic theory (6, chapters 7 and 8. 
This means that if the feasible activity or program vector z of (4) 
satisfies all restrictions in (8) and (9) and maximizes function g(Z) of 
(7), then we call that a feasible optimum program. That optimal feasible 
solution will bring about an allocation of resources whose relation to a 
given set of prices is consistent with that of a profit-maximizing firm 
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meeting the necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium. 
2. Economic activities and restrictions 
In programming language the means of implementing the objectives 
sought by the entrepreneur are expressed through the n "activities" or 
"processes". An activity could be loosely defined as "a way of doing 
things". The basic idea behind the concept of activity is that there are 
different manners, i.e., different composition of inputs, to obtain the 
same results. 
For instance, a farmer may use more or less seed per acre in growing 
a crop. This would represent two different activities. But if using the 
same amount of seed per acre he plants twice as much area as before, it 
is the same activity but used at a different level.^  
Activities are not only confined to physical operations. They may 
be purchasing, selling, borrowing activities as well as "artificial" 
activities. The latter are used for special purposes such as the fulfill­
ment of the family living restriction. 
The availability of inputs is expressed by the resource restriction 
vector b as in (2) that represents the supply level of different resources. 
Here again, the restrictions are not confined to physical resources but 
also may include financial, institutional and other types of restric­
tions. 
In our model the entrepreneur has three channels towards which and 
*Here we encounter the familiar assumptions of constant returns to 
scale, additivity and divisibility of inputs and outputs. They may be 
somewhat embarrassing at times. 
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according to his preferences, the resources can be allocated. These are 
family consumption, investment in the farm and investment outside the 
farm. The details of how this activity operates are given in the models 
presented below. 
3. A numerical illustration 
The main characteristics of the dynamic programming technique can be 
better understood by considering the contrasts between models using dif­
ferent objectives functions and different sets of activities. The farm 
situation presented below is an over-simplification of reality and its 
only purpose is to serve as example of the models. The resource supplies 
or restrictions and the activities common to all models are summarized in 
Table 4. Summary of a farm situation for different models. 
Restraints affecting the operator Production alternatives open to 
the operator 
200 tillable acres of land livestock activities : 
$9000 of operating capital 2-litter hog enterprise 
30 units of hog space and manage­ crop activities: 
rial ability for production 
30 hog units C-C-C 
1072 hours of labor C-C-0-M-M 
$4500 of fixed costs (family C-Sb-0-M-M 
living plus depreciation 
and taxes) other activities: 
Corn buying 
Corn selling 
In table 5 a brief summary of the characteristics proper to each 
model is presented. Each model covers a period of three years. 
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Table 5. Special features of each model 
Objective function Special activities Interest rate used 
Model maximized included in discount factor 
A Discounted total returns Capital selling 5% 
of terminal planning year 
B Sum of discounted net Capital selling 57» 
returns of the 3 years 
C Discounted total returns No capital selling 5% 
of terminal planning year 
D Sum of discounted net No capital selling 57» 
returns of the 3 years 
2 Discounted total returns Capital selling with 20% 
of terminal planning year 20% interest rate 
F Sum of discounted net Capital selling with 20% 
returns of the 3 years 20% interest rate 
The optimal plan for each of the six models is presented in Table 6. 
It can be seen that the allocation of resources in the three models does 
G 
not differ greatly. What differs from one model to the other is the level 
of profits or returns. The crop activities selected (C-C-C and C-C-O-M-M) 
and the hog enterprise appear at the same level in the six optimal plans. 
All models include in their optimal plan 188.4 acres of the first rotation 
and 11.6 acres of the second one. Likewise, all plans include 21 units 
of hogs each year. 
The limiting resource in every year of the plan is labor. Capital 
is not limiting in the first year: $640 is allocated to the capital sell­
ing activity or to capital disposal according to the model. 
Models A, C and E maximize'discounted total returns. The respec-
A 
tive amounts are $36,895, $32,946 and $24,526. Model A includes a sell­
ing activity which explains the higher returns than in the other two 
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gable 6* level of selected activities la 3*year optimal plane for a 200-
Tear Activity Bene Model A Model B Modoi 
0 family living $5%00 $5*K* $5%00 
0 (WW 118.4 aerea 188*4 acres 188.% 
0 C-C-O^ JW* 11.6 acree 11.6 acree 11.6 
0 Corn Selling 852] bu. 8538 to. 9036 
0 Capital Selling $6Wo $6*10 » 
0 Capital Disposal & 
0 Sara Buying <9 515 
0 Bogs 21 unite 21 unit® 21 
1 Com Selling 8537 M, 8538 to. 6539 
1 Capital Selling $9985 $9321 -
1 Capital Disposal - - « 
1 Cora Staying * - 7991 
1 Sags 21 unite 21 unite 21 
2 Com Selling 8538 to. @538 to. 233 
2 Capital Selling $19681 $9297 $ 
9 Capital Disposal 
- -
2 Corn Buying - -
2 Hog® 
- • 1% 
3 Discounted total or 
net returns® 
$368)5 ,$39681 $3 
* Model® Â,C sad 1 maximize total returns, Model® B,D, and F z 
or a 200-aoree fana obtained by using different dynamic programing meddle. 
Modal C Medal D Model : Modal F 
$5^ 00 $5400 $5400 $5400 
188,4 acree 188*4 acree 188*4 aeree 188.4 aeree 
He 6 acre* 11.5 aeree 11.6 aoree 11.6 aeree 






515 tn. - -
21 imite 21 units 21 imite 21 unit® 
8539 ta. 16528 ba. 8539 b*. 8539 ta. 
-
- $9984 $9320 
« $9320 -
7991 t»a. -
21 units 21 units 21 mit s 21 mit® 
23380 bu, 8538 ba. 8539 8538 bu. 
$ - - $19630 $9297 
« $9297 « -
14842 bu. «, 21 unit© SEL unit# 
$32946 $38963 $24526 $30904 
, and F maximize a@fc returns. 
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models. Model B has 110 capital selling activity and Model E has a sell­
ing activity but with an interest rate of 20%. This explains the 
relative lower level of returns in Model E's optimal plan. 
Models B, D and F maximize the sum of discounted net returns for the 
three years included in the plan. These amount to $39,681, $38,963 and 
$30,904. Model B has a selling activity which accounts for the higher 
level of profits obtained in this model's optimum plan. 
Model D's optimum plan includes a corn buying activity. To have a 
corn buying activity (with higher price relatively to the corn selling 
activity) and a corn selling activity appearing in the same optimal 
plan looks inconsistent. It is explained by the fact that if a model 
has no capital selling activity the excess capital supply becomes a 
free resource. It can then be used to even buy corn which is sold at 
a lower price.* 
Apparently, the internal rate of growth is greater than the 
external rate of 20% in Models K and F. The optimal plans of these two 
models show the same allocation of resources as in Models A and B, 
although the level of returns is different. It remains to be seen 
whether or not the optimum plan would change when the level of capital 
is varied and it becomes limiting in the first year. 
When net returns are maximized as in Model D, the corn buying 
activity does not come into the optimum plan, because it has a negative 
price, -1.24, contrariwise to Model 0 in which its price is zero. 
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D. A Model for an Orner-Operated Farm 
The logic and technique of the model presented in Figure 4 can be 
explained by making a brief statement of the activities and restrictions 
of each year. Some necessary simplifications have been made for explan­
atory purposes. 
1. Restrictions and activities in year k=0 
The resource restrictions in year k=0 are land, capital, hay, corn, 
livestock building space and labor. These are denoted by b^  Q, b^  Q, 
3^ 0s 4^ 0' ^5 0' ^6 0" Of these six restrictions there are four which 
have positive values in the original matrix. The hay and corn restric­
tions bg Q and b^  Q, are equal to zero because no feed has yet been 
produced. 
There are two more restrictions in year 0 which cannot be included 
among the resource supplies. These are family consumption and capital 
rationing, b? and bg Q. 
The family consumption restriction permits the annual withdrawal of 
funds from capital resources. This restriction, b^ , carries no year sub­
script because it represents the amount consumed in all the four years of 
the plan. Family consumption is expressed by an artificial activity or 
column P^  in our model. This activity must be forced into the program 
according to the assumptions of the model. Thus, operating funds in the 
first year and in any other year will not be available for the real 
activities as long as P , affixed with an arbitrarily large price -î- M, 
1 
does not come into the program at the full level of the family living 
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restriction.* In a more refined model the family living restriction 
should be allowed to increase above the minimum level of family 
consumption. 
The capital rationing restriction has a role similar to that of the 
family living restriction. Capital borrowing is also expressed by an 
activity x^ > (P^  q for year k=0 in the model). Capital borrowed by 
the farmer may have different costs according to the farmer's subjective 
discount rates and actual borrowing charges. In other words, the entre­
preneur may be affected by internal and external capital rationing. 
Hence, at a given rate of interest only a limited amount may be loaned to 
a farmer. Any amount borrowed in excess of this minimum will make the 
rate of interest go up. Hence the capital rationing restriction indicates 
the amount of capital available at the first given rate of interest. In 
a less simplified model than this, more than one capital borrowing activ­
ity at progressively higher rates would demand a corresponding number of 
additional capital rationing restrictions. 
Crop activities in year k=0 include a rotation at different levels 
of fertilization and conservation practices. The levels of fertilization 
and conservation are indicated by the first two subscripts attached to 
the rotation name. The year the rotation starts is symbolized by the last 
T^he pseudo-returns obtained from this artificial activity most be 
substracted from the total returns of the optimal feasible solution. For 
that reason, it is perhaps more convenient to affix the disposal or slack 
variable of the family living restriction with an arbitrarily large price 
-M which will force out the disposal (hence bringing in P^ ) without 
affecting the level of returns of the final plan. 
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subscript. For instance, COM^  ^  Q, Pg, means a three-year rotation of 
corn, oats and meadow starting in year k=0 using a low level of ferti­
lization and contouring. COMg 21' ^16' t'ie same rotation starting 
in year k=l using high fertilization and terracing. 
Each rotation uses land, capital and labor. Hence the a , coef-
1] K 
ficients carry a positive sign. For example, one unit of COWL . n, i.e., 191 >u 
Pg, uses a^  g 0 = 1 of land, a^  g Q of capital and a^  g Q of labor. 
In year k=0 each rotation produces hay. Hence, the coefficient 
corresponding to the hay supply is negative. In COM^  ^  Q, the hay produc­
tion is signified by the negative coefficient -a^  g q in the hay restric­
tion row i=3. Notice that in year k=0 the coefficient in the corn row 
restriction for all the activities starting in that year only represents 
the oats produced in that year. The reason is that corn, contrariwise 
to oats, is produced that year but is not fed until the beginning of the 
following year. 
In order to simplify computations it is assumed that each unit of 
crop rotation, i.e., one acre, is evenly distributed between the crops 
composing that rotation. In the COM example, each acre grows one third 
of com, one third of oats and one third of meadow during every year which 
the rotation lasts. The same plot of land is assumed to successively 
rotate the three crops in the three-year duration of the rotation.* 
If single crop activities were used instead of rotation activities 
This interpretation of a crop activity in dynamic model simplifies 
considerably the computations. The different coefficients remain 
unaltered during the three years. 
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the number of land restrictions would be increased. The reason is that 
land yields differently according to the crop grown in the previous 
years. Consequently, the same plot of land following different crops 
would need different land restrictions. In large empirical problems 
the multiplication of land restrictions may make the computations un­
manageable. 
The only livestock activity in year 0 is hog production. requires 
a2 2 0 dollars of capital, Q tons of hay, 2 0 bushels of corn, 
a5 2 0 3^ usrs feet of building space and ag 2 0 ^ ours labor. All 
these coefficients carry a positive sign. 
The remaining activities of year 0 are corn buying (Pg^ ), Capital 
welling or external investment (P^ g) and capital borrowing (P^ ) • Corn 
buying uses a0 __ n dollars of the capital supply and increases the corn 
supply, b^  Q, by -a^  ^  Q bushels, i.e., one bushel. Capital selling, 
is an inter-year activity. One dollar of external investment in 
year 0 will produce -a^  ^  1 dollars in year 1. Hay transfer, P^ , is 
another inter-year activity. Its purpose is to permit the use of hay 
disposal of year 0 in year 1. Hence, it uses one unit of hay in year 0, 
a3 39 0* and "Produces" one unit in year 1, -a^  39 
It is important to notice that all the activities of year 0 have a 
zero price. There is one exception, however. This is the family living 
activity, P^ , which has a price +M as explained above.. Now, if any of 
the activities of year 0 having a zero price produce any returns, these 
returns appear in the capital row of the following year with a negative 
sign. This statement needs a qualification, however. It does not apply 
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to crop activities as it will be explained in the next section. 
2„ Restrictions and activities of year 1 
The restrictions in year 1 are the same as in year 0 with one 
exception. There is a new restriction b^  Livestock Equipment. It is 
included to account for the previous year's investment in equipment of 
livestock activities. The value of that type of equipment is ordinarily 
not included in the fixed costs of the farm. Hence the need of a new 
restriction row b^  which shows the amount of livestock equipment 
"produced" in year 0. 
It can be noticed that in year 1 there are two hog activities, 
and P^ . In technical terms they are the same: they consume the same 
amount of inputs and produce the same amount of output. In economic 
terms they are different, however. Their capital coefficients, a^  ^ ^  
and a^ Q ^  are different. The first does not include the expense due 
to special equipment. The second has a higher value than the first 
b ecause it includes the cost of livestock equipment. The first activity, 
Pg, yields higher net returns because it uses equipment purchased in the 
previous year (or years). Hence, the positive a^  ^ ^  in the livestock 
equipment row which means that P^  uses up that equipment. 
The second hog activity, P^ , has a zero coefficient in that same 
row. This implies that if the hog producing activity's opportunity cost 
is high, after using up the previous year's livestock equipment(P^  comes 
into the plan), a new activity, P^ , comes into the plan. The capital 
coefficient of the latter, a^  ^ includes the per unit cost of the 
equipment. Consequently, the inclusion of a double livestock activity 
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every year is intended to give more flexibility to the model. 
The second hog activity, P^ , has a aero coefficient in that same row. 
This implies that if the hog producing activity's opportunity cost is 
high, after using up the previous year's livestock equipment (P^  comes 
into the plan), a new activity, P^ , comes into the plan. The capital 
coefficient of the latter, a^  ^ includes the per unit cost of the 
equipment. Consequently, the inclusion of a double livestock activity 
every year is intended to give more flexibility to the model. 
The same function fulfills the four rotation activities starting in 
year 1: P^ , P^ , P^ > and P^ , Land which due to lack of capital could 
have been in disposal in year 0, can be employed in later years as capital 
resources are built up. 
An important feature of the model is that crops which are just pro­
duced do not realize any returns. All the coefficients in the d^  row 
corresponding to crop activities are zero. The reason is that returns 
from crops are only realized when transferred to a selling activity and 
marketed. The corn selling activity for year 1 is P^ . It has a positive 
a12 28 1=1 in t*ie corn row and a negative -a^  2g -1.14 (assuming the 
selling price of corn is $1.14 per bushel). This means that for every 
unit of corn which is sold there is a return of $1,14. Likewise, hay 
returns are realized through a hay selling activity, P^ . 
3. Restrictions and activities of year 2 and year 3 
The activities and restrictions of year 2 do not present any new 
characteristic. They follow the same logic as those of the previous year. 
In year 3 and the last included in the plan a new restriction appears 
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for the first time, namely terraced land, y Consider the four three-
year rotations starting in year k=0. Two of them, P^  and P^ , use a low 
level of conservation practices. The other two, P^  and P^ ,^ use terrac­
ing, that is, a high level of conservation. After three years have 
1 
elapsed, two types of land will be freed for production. The first has 
no terraces and the second possesses them. Hence, P^  and P^  have a 
negative coefficient, -a^  n 3 = ~1 an<* ~a26 12 3 = *"n t*ie terraced 
land restriction, b^ g y 
The rotation activities starting in year k=3 present also a differ­
ence with regard to previous years. There are in effect two new activities: 
T T 
C0M1 2 3 an<1 C0M2 2 3' P25 and P26 have a positive coefficient 
equal to 1 in the terraced land row because they use, apart from the 
usual unit of land resource, b^  ^, an additional unit of terraced land 
resource, b^  
Notice that there are in.the same year other activities which employ 
\ 
terracing, namely P^  and P^ . These activities require a larger amount 
of capital than P^  and P^ , however. The reason is that the latter do 
not include the capital expense due to terracing; the terraced have been 
already built in year k=0. 
The last point worth mentioning about the model is that there are 
only five non-zero prices in the d., row: those corresponding to hog 
Jk 
activities, P^  and Pg, com selling^ , P^ Q, capital selling, P^ , hay 
A^ccording to our assumptions regarding rotation activities all land 
after that particular rotation has the same level of fertility. 
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selling^ » P42» and capital borrowing, P^ g. The first four are positive 
and are discounted to their present value in year k=0. All returns are 
( 
realized through these four activities. 
Capital borrowing^ , P^ y> carries a negative sign in its corresponding 
price, d^ g Evidently, it represents the payment of the amount borrowed 
by Pg^  plus the interest rate on the loan. This is substracted from the 
total returns of the firm. 
There are other activities in the matrix which for simplicity are 
not presented in Figure 4. These are the disposal or slack variables 
which form the unit matrix of order mxm. 
The last row of the matrix, z -d , is the criterion row. It indi-jk J* 
cates the amount by which returns will be increased if the activity level 
is increased by one unit. In that same row in the P^ 's or resource, 
output or supply remainer column, the levels of total returns of each 
plan is indicated. 
E. A Dynamic Model for a Crop-Share Rented Farm 
In Figure 5 a three-year dynamic linear programming model for a 
share-rented farm is presented. The logic of this model and the one 
presented above is essentially the same. The main difference between the 
two models is that in the new model there are two groups of- activities 
and restrictions: those pertaining to the tenant and those to the land-
L T lord. Likewise, there are two price rows, d^  and d^ > and two marginal 
L L XT 
revenue rows, z . - d . and z . - d . . In order to avoid repetition only 
JK  JK  JK  JK  
the features in which the two models specifically differ will be explained 
below. 
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The tenant's restrictions are the same as those in the owner-operator 
model. The landlord has two restrictions in each year: capital and corn. 
In a share-rented farm, capital expense is shared in a given propor­
tion between landlord and tenant. Hence the need for two capital re-
V 
strictions each year. The landlord's capital restrictions are b0 n, 
b12,l and b22,2* 
In a rented farm also crops are shared in a specific ration. Hence 
a new corn restriction for the landlord is introduced, b_ n, b._ - and 
bgg 2 f°r Che three-year period covered by the model. Oats is planted 
and harvested within a given year, however. The crop activities carry a 
negative coefficient in the landlord's capital row (as well as in the 
tenant's) because oats is expressed in corn equivalent. The coefficient 
indicates the amount received by the tenant as a share of that crop. 
2. Activities 
The activities P^  to P^ are tenant's activities and P^  to P^  
landlord's activities.* As in the owner-operator farm model, returns 
z 
from crops are not realized until transferred to a corn selling activity. 
In this model also returns forthcoming to the landlord from his share of 
crops are not realized until the corn is marketed through com selling 
Q, P33> corn selling P^ , corn selling P35* 
Returns of the landlord from hay or meadow activities are not rea­
lized through a selling activity. The reason is that the landlord does 




not share in the product but rather receives a rental payment in cash. 
The cash payment in each year is credited to his capital row, if that 
payment is greater than the landlord's expenses in the other two crops 
included in the rotation, i.e., corn and oats, then the rotation activity 
will have a negative coefficient in the landlord's capital restriction 
row. If the expenses are greater than the cash rental, the coefficient 
will be positive, because the activity then "consumes" landlord capital. 
Hence, the ± sign in all the crop activities coefficients corresponding 
to landlord's capital in Figure 5.1 
It can be noticed that all livestock activities have only zero coeffi­
cients in the rows corresponding to the landlord's restrictions. The 
reason is that this model follows the customary crop share-lease of the 
Midwest; the lease does not provide for sharing of costs and returns in 
livestock enterprises. The tenant bears all the expenses incurred by 
those enterprises and also receives all the returns. But the model could 
be adapted to other type of leasing arrangement such as a livestock lease. 
It would only be a matter of estimating the coefficients for landlord and 
tenant and including them in the model. 
3. Prices and the criterion row 
The landlord price row, d^ ., has only three positive coefficients 
JK 
corresponding to the three corn selling activities, P^ , P^  and P^  
These three prices d^  q» d^  ^ and d^  g are discounted to present value 
1 
An alternative way to credit the landolord with the cash rental 
returns is by including their discounted values in the landlord's price 
row d., . 
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as seen above. 
The feature which makes this model differ most from the precedent 
one is the inclusion of two criterion rows instead of a unique one as is 
the general case in models employing the simplex method. The landlord's 
L L T T 
criterion row is z„. - d., and the tenant's is z„. - d ..where z., is as jk jk jk jk jk 
usual the opportunity cost and d., the gross or market price. j k  
These two functions can be maximized separately to obtain an optimum 
feasible solution for both the landlord and the tenant.^  These will pro­
vide the means to test hypotheses regarding efficiency of alternative 
tenure systems and to isolate tenure factors causing dissociations of 
benefits and costs. 
F. A Short-Term Dynamic Model for a Crop-Share Farm 
In figure 6 a 2-year dynamic linear programming model for a crop-
share rented farm is presented. As it can be readily seen the logic and 
mechanics of this model does not differ greatly from the one presented 
above. The dissimilarities arise rather from the economic interpretations 
of activities and coefficients, 
1. Single crop activities 
Contrariwise to the ones above, this model does not have any crop 
rotations activities. The reason is that a tenant having a short planning 
horizon does not plan on a long-term basis. Each year he chooses single 
crops which he things will maximize his returns. Hence, the model uses 
A^s long as there is an optimum feasible solution. 
1 
X 
Figure 6. A two-year dynamic programming model for a crop-share rented 
farm 
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single crops as activities. 
For example, a unit of  ^q, that is P^ , represents an acre of 
corn grown in year k=0 at a low level of fertilization and only using 
contouring as a conservation practice. It can be noticed that the 
coefficients in the two corn rows of that first year are equal to zero. 
This means that corn produced that year is not accounted until the begin­
ning of the following because it can neither be fed or sold until then. 
Consequently, landlord and tenant's second year corn coefficients 
'*15,5,1 and '*16,5,1 are negatlve-
The above qualification does not apply to oats and meadow activities. 
Oats and hay can be fed and sold within the same year it is sown. There­
fore, the corn rows of the first year, k=0, carry positive coefficients 
in the oats activities.* Meadow activities as well carry positive 
coefficients in the hay row of the first year. 
Another point that should be stressed is that there are no second-year 
activities start at a high level of conservation, i.e., with terracing. 
It is then assumed that a farmer expecting to leave the farm at the end 
of the year does not care to make any investment in terracing. In economic 
terms this means that the present value of expected returns is equal to 
zero under this assumption. 
It is also noted that costs incurred by terracing are all charged to 
the tenant within the period covered by the lease. In the case of longer 
ter# leasing arrangements these costs can.be spread over a larger number 
of years becoming thus less onerous to the tenant. 
*0ats output is expressed in_corn equivalent. 
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO A CASE SITUATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the empirical situation 
to which the dynamic models presented above will be applied. Details 
will be given with regard to the farm selected for this study and 
the different resource restrictions under which profits will be max­
imized. 
A. Description of the Farm and Its Location 
The farm selected for study as representative of the Iowa section 
of the MINK study is located in Fremont County, southwestern Iowa. It 
is 260 acres in size, of which 220 acres have field crops and pastures. 
The remaining 40 acres include the farmstead, buildings, roads, fences, 
wasteland and timber. 
The farm is located within the Marshall soil association which 
occupies nearly level to gently sloping ridges and rolling lands of 
2 to 14 per cent slopes. Marshall soils are "medium textures, moder­
ately permeable and well drained. Control of sheet and gully erosion 
is a major soil management problem. Level terraces are used to good 
advantage on these soils" (38,p. 2). Under good management these soils 
are considered very productive within the state of Iowa. 
B. Descriptions of the Resource and Institutional Restrictions 
1. Land restriction 
Since the land of the farm has different characteristics with regard 
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to slope and productivity, it has been divided into two groups for the 
purpose of this study: Land A and Land B. 
Land A has 60 acres with slope less than 5 percent and Land B 
has 160 acres with a slope from 8 to 12 percent. Table 7 shows the 
different types of soils found in the farm. The level of fertility is 
considered low medium in P^ O^  and high in K. It is assumed that land 
previously has been under a crop rotation which included one or two years 
of meadow. 
Table 7. Soil characteristics of farm in Fremont County, Iowa 
Acres with slope 
Total Less than From 8 to Percent of 
Soil type acres 4 percent 12 percent total 
Marshall silt loam 49.5 49.5 22.5 
Judson silt loam 10.5 10.5 4.8 
Marshall silt loam 160.0 160.0 
Source: Soil Conservation District, Fremont County, Iowa 
2. Capital and machinery 
It is assumed that the farm in question has machinery as shown in 
Table 8. However, a custom operator is hired to bale hay. In this 
machinery inventory specialized livestock equipment is not included. It 
must be purchased by the operator. 
The levels of capital assumed for owner-operator and landlord and 
tenant in a share-rented farm are given in Table 9. This is not only 
operating capital but it does include the amount required for family 
consumption in case of the owner-operator and tenant. 
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Tractor, 30-40 belt HP 3,090.00 10 309.00 
Plow, 3 14" 434.00 15 28.93 
Tandem disc, 10" 410.00 15 27.33 
Harrow, 4 section 142.00 15 9.47 
Corn planter, 2 row 276.00 15 18.40 
Cultivator 294.00 15 19.60 
Wagons, 2 400.00 12 33.33 
Manure spreader 493.00 15 32.87 
Sprayer 195.00 15 13.00 
Pick-up truck, % ton 1,840.00 10 184.00 
Corn picker, 2 2,191.00 15 82.67 
Power mower 366.00 14 26.14 
Endgate seeder 80.00 15 5.33 
Rotary hoe 433.00 15 28.87 
Combine 1,790.00 15 119.33 
$12,434.00 $938.27 





Source: MINK study, Iowa section 
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It can be noted that the level of capital for the owner-operator is 
not equal to the sum of the capital resources contributed by both land­
lord and tenant in a rented farm. 
3. Labor supply 
Labor resources in this study is understood as direct labor input 
of the operator which includes "time spent in growing, harvesting, stor­
ing and selling crops or time spent in feeding, caring for and market­
ing livestock products" (22, p, 9). The family labor is used only for 
indirect labor input excepting some extra days in May, June and July 
when the operator is assumed to receive some help in the planting and 
cultivation of crops. Labor availability in January, February, July, 
August, September, October, November and December is considered ade­
quate or noi. limiting. The rest of the months of the year are grouped 
together in order to avoid computational complexities. This can be 
justified because labor operations in many cases can be shifted over 
time or postponed. The total labor available is given in Table 10. 
Table 10. Labor supply of operator in hours of direct labor input 
Month Working days Hours/day Total hours 
March-April 52 8% 442 
May-June 62* 10 650 
I^ncludes 13 days furnished by the operator's family 
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4. Building space restrictions 
Hay and grain storage capacity is assumed to be adequate. One 
2-litter hog unit is defined as 50 square feet of building space. It 
is assumed that 20 of such units are available on the farm. Cattle units 
are to a certain extent substitutable for hog units. The requirements 
of different hog and cattle enterprises are presented in Table 11. 
Yearling steers do not require any building space. 
Table 11. Building space requirements of livestock enterprises. 
Name of Steer calves Steer calves Hogs (1:0) Hogs (1:1) 
enterprise on pasture drylot feed spring spr.-fall 
0.4 0.6 0.75 1.0 
5. Management 
The profit of a firm depends on the efficiency of operation and 
ultimately on the managerial ability of the operator. The manager or 
entrepreneur is the person who combines the different resources and 
chooses between alternative production plans. There can be, of course, 
different levels of managerial capacity. For the purposes of this study 
all plans are computed assuming an average capacity in the person of the 
farm operator. Although a precise definition cannot be given we under­
stand by "average" manager one who ordinarily uses the following set of 
practices (22, p. 101). 
1) Use of recommended varieties 
2) Weed control included only limited use of herbicide 
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3) Oats and corn seed treated; legumes inoculated; corn borer and 
grasshopper controlled 
4) Most operations within allowable range of timeliness, but not 
necessarily at the optimum point 
5) Planting rates per acre approximate the following: corn -
12,000 stalks, oats - 1% bushels, soybeans - 1 bushel, alfalfa 
brome mix - 15 pounds 
6) Optimum planting depth used. 
Besides, an "average" manager will possess some technical education, 
some experience of farming and will take part, although not assuming an 
outstanding role, in the activities of farmers associations and other com­
munity organizations. 
6. Household consumption 
It is assumed that the household is composed of the operator, his 
wife and two or three children. The living costs, including also health 
insurance and income and property taxes, amount to $4,560 per year for the 
owner-operator and $3,520 for the share-tenant. The difference between 
the two amounts is due to real estate taxes and crop and building insur­
ance which are charged only to the owner-operator as shown on Appendix A. 
7. Leasing restrictions 
Although the form of the lease is not exactly a restriction it is 
included here because up to a certain extent the lease affects some of 
the restrictions such as capital and com - it adds extra capital and 
corn rows to the input and output matrix for the landlord every year. 
The typical crop-share-cash lease of the Middle West shares costs and 
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returns as shown on Table 12. 
Table 12. Typical crop-share-cash lease of the Middle West 
Receipts or expenses 
Item Tenant share (%) Landlord share (%) 
Corn 50 50 
Soybeans 50 50 
Oats 60 40 
Fertilizer and seed expenses3 50 50 
Real state expenses 0 100 
Operating expenses 100 0 
Feeder cattle and hogs 100 0 
Labor, including hired 100 0 
L^andlord furnishes all of the grass and legume seed while tenant 
furnishes all of the seed oats. Landlord receives a cash rental on hay 
of $13 in Land A and of $12 in Land B. 
C. Prices 
Prices used in this study try to maintain the historical price 
relationships among inputs and outputs existing in the years previous 
to i960. The reason is that the agricultural entrepreneur is assumed to 
make his long term plan in year 1960. The mean value of 1955-59 prices 
was used for programming the different farm plans. These prices are 
given in Table 13. 
The mean value of yearly prices is a relatively simple model of 
price expectations for the entrepreneur. It was used in this study 
because in the period considered relevant input and output prices did not 
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Table 13. Mean value of 1955-59 prices 
Input or output and unit Price in dollars 
Crops: 
Corn per bushel (buying) 1.24 
Corn per bushel (selling) 1.14 
Oats per bushel .63 
Soybeans per bushel 2.16 
Hay per ton 6.00 
Feeder calves : 
October calves per cwt. 27.00 
Feeder yearling steers: 
November medium per cwt. 19.00 
October choice per cwt. 25.00 
Slaughter cattle: 
April medium per cwt. 22.00 
June choice per cwt. 24.00 
August choice per cwt. 25.00 
September choice per cwt. 25.00 
October choice per cwt. 25.00 
Hogs : 
May gilts and barrows per cwt. 17.00 
October and November gilts and barrows per cwt. 15.00 
January sows per cwt. 14.40 
August sows per cwt. 15.50 
Fertilizer: 
Nitrogen per pound . 13 
Phosphate per pound .09 
Potash per pound .05 
Source: (21) and (39). 
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vary such as to warrant the use of a more elaborated model. Besides, the 
distorting effect of livestock price cycles on the relationships between 
livestock prices and other prices seems to have been eliminated because 
a complete livestock price cycle appears to be included in the five years 
considered. 
D. Crop Enterprises 
The present section endeavors to give a brief description of the 
activities used for programming the different farm plans. The two long-
term models, i.e., those for owner-operator and crop-share operator cover­
ing a six-year period, permit the farmer to choose each year between 
different crop rotations. The short-term model, i.e., the two-year model 
for a crop-share tenant or landlord, has single crops as activities 
instead of crop rotations. 
The extrepreneur chooses every year the crops which he thinks will 
maximize his returns given his capital and other resources, price and 
yield expectations, risk perference, consumption patterns, etc. If the 
latter factors are maintained at a fixed level, the effect of various 
leasing arrangements on the choice of crops and ultimately on total 
returns can be investigated. 
1. Long term rotations 
The selection of rotations to include among the activities in the 
long-term models was based on previous studies for the same type of soil 
(13, 15) and on information coming from soil scientists and agronomists. 
In Table 14 the yields estimates for rotations planted on Land A and in 
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Table 14. Estimated crop-rotation yields for various levels of conservation and fertilization in 
Land A and Land B 
Marshall silt loam Land A a Slope: 1-4% 
Practices : 
Fertilizers: 
No conservation Contouring Terracing 
No Low High No Low High No Low High 
50b 55b 69b 55 60 74 55 60 74 
30 35 42 30 35 42 33 38 45 
2.2 2.4 3.0 2.2 2.4 3.0 2.2 2.4 3.0 
50 55 69 55 60 74 55 60 74 
45 50 68 50 55 72 50 55 72 
30 35 42 30 35 42 33 38 45 
2.2 2.4 3.0 2.2 2.4 3.0 2.2 2.4 3.0 
2.2 2.5 3.2 2.2 2.5 3.2 2.2 2.5 3.2 
50 55 69 55 60 74 55 60 74 
20 24 26 22 25 27 23 26 28 
44 49 68 49 54 71 49 54 71 
30 35 42 30 35 42 33 38 45 
2.2 2.4 3.0 2.2 2.4 3,0 2.2 2.4 3.0 
50 55 69 55 60 74 55 60 74 
43 48 68 48 53 72 48 53 72 
30 35 42 30 35 42 33 38 45 




















Land - Marshall - Monona in Walnut Township, Fremont County, Iowa. 
'Yield of corn, oats, soybeans in bushels/acre; meadow is in tons/acre. 
"Meadow, M^ , is first year alfalfa - brome mixture, 3 cuttings. 
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Table 14 (Continued) 
Practices : 
Fertilizers: 
Marshall silt loam Land Aa Slope: 1-4% 
No conservation Contouring Terracing 
No Low High No Low High No Low High 
Corn.d 43 48 63 45 50 65 48 53 68 
Corn. 40 45 63 42 47 65 45 50 68 
Corn^  37 42 63 39 44 65 42 47 68 
Corn4-10 30 35 63 32 37 
65 35 40 68 
Land Ba Slope: 8-12% 
Cornu 36b 41» 54b 39 44 57 42 47 60 
Oats 20 25 32 21 26 33 24 29 36 
Meadow^  2.0C 2.2 2.7 2.0 2.2 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.8 
Com 36 41 54 39 44 57 42 47 60 
Com» 33 38 50 36 41 53 39 44 58 
Oats 20 25 32 21 26 33 24 29 36 
Meadow^  2.0 2.2 2.7 2.0 2.2 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.8 
Meadow^  2.0 2.2 2.8 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.1 2.3 3.0 
Corn. 36 41 54 39 44 57 42 47 60 
Corn- 30 35 48 33 38 52 38 42 57 
Oats 20 25 32 21 26 33 24 29 36 
Meadow 2.0 2.2 2.7 2.0 2.2 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.8 
Source: Frank F. Riecken, W. F. Shrader, and David F. Slusher, Agronomy Department, Iowa State 
University. Private communication. Feb. 22, 1960 
A^ssumption is that fertility level is low-medium in PgO^ , high in K; rotation has been corn, 
corn, oats, meadow, meadow. 
/ 
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Table 15 the ones for rotations grown on Land B are given.* 
In Land A there are five alternatives: COM,CCOMM, CSbCOM, CCOM, 
2 
and CCC. In Land B there is a choice of three rotations: COM, CCOMM, 
and CCOM. 
The assumptions under which the yields were estimated are several. 
The fertility level in year k=0 is considered low-medium in P^ O^  and high 
in K. It is assumed that the farm land has been previously rotated with 
CCOMM, CCOM or COM. That is, the rotations used on that farm included at 
lease one third of meadow. Low-medium fertility practices were had in 
these rotations. It is further assumed, that the meadow is alfalfa-brome 
mixture and that it permits three annual cuttings. 
Three levels of fertilization were used. The first one assumes no 
fertilization practices.. The second one represents a low level of 
fertilization that may correspond approximately to the one obtained by 
manure spreading as practiced on some farms. The third one, a high level 
of fertilization, employs commercial fertilizers as shown in Table 15 for 
Land A and B respectively. In the high level of fertilization it is fur­
ther assumed that besides the nitrogen and phosphate quantities shown in 
the tables, a rate of 10 pounds of K^ O us required per acre. 
Three levels of conservation are considered in this study. The first 
*For a description of Land A and Land B we refer back to this same 
chapter, section A. 
2 As explained above the meaning of the symbols are as follows: C is 
corn, 0 is oats, M is meadow and Sb is soybeans. For instance CCC stands 
for continuous corn and COM for a 3-hear rotation of corn, oats and 
meadow. 
Table 15. Pounds per acre of available nutrients supplied by commercial fertilizers for different 
rotations, conservation and fertilization levels 
Practices: 
Fertilizers: 
Marshall silt loam Land Aa,b Slope: 2-5% 
No conservation Contouring Terracing 
No Low 








N P N P 
High 
N P 
Corn0 5 5+10 5 5+10 5 5+10 
Oats 0+10 10+0 0+10 10+0 0+10 10+0 
Meadow 0+10 0+10 0+10 
Corn0 5 5+10 5 5+10 5 5+10 
Corn 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 50+10 
Oats 0+10 10+0 0+10 10+0 0+10 10+0 
Meadow 0+10 0+10 0+10 
Meadow 0+10 0+10 0+10 
CornC 5 5+10 5 5+10 5+10 
Soybeans 
Corn 5 35+10 5 35+10 5 35+10 
Oats 0+10 10+0 0+10 10+0 0+10 10+0 
Meadow 0+10 0+10 0+10 
Corn0 5 5+10 5 5+10 5 5+10 
Corn 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 50+10 
Oats 0+10 10+0 o+lO 10+0 0+10 10+0 
Meadow 0+10 0+10 0+10 
aLow-medium fertilization practices in 1958 and 1959. 
b10 pounds KgO on all high corn. 
°Assume previous rotation is the same as the one used. 
Table 15 (Continued) 
Marshall silt loam Land A3'*5 Slope: 2-5% 
Practices: No conservation Contouring Terracing 
Fertilizers No Low High No Low High No Low High 
N P N P N k N P N P N P N P N P N P 
Corn 1960e* 5 35+10 5 35+10 5 35+10 
Corn 1961 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 50+10 
Corn 1962 5 50+10 50+10 5 50+10 
Com 1963-1970 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 50+10 
Marshall silt loam Land B8'^  Slope: 9-14% 
Corn0 5 5+25 5 5+25 5 5+25 
Oats 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 
Meadow 
Corn0 5 5+25 5 5+25 5 5+25 
Corn 5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
Oats 0+10 10+10 0+10 110+10 0+10 10+10 
Meadow 
Meadow 0+10 0+10 0+10 
Corn0 5 5+25 5 5+25 5 51*25 
Corn 5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
Oats 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 
Meadow 
Source: Private communication by John T. Pesek and Frank F. Riecken, Agronomy Department, Iowa 
State University, Feb. 22, 1960 
A^ssume that Corn, Corn, OatSg g and Corn, Corn, Corn, follow Corn, Corn, Oats, Meadow, 
Meadow, or Corn, Oats, Meadow. 
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one uses no conservation practices. The second one uses contouring for 
all grain crops. The third one uses contouring and also terraces. It 
is assumed that in years previous to the one considered in our study, 
1.e., 1960, no terraces were built on the farm. 
2. Erosion effect on yields 
The maximum erosion rate compatible with the maintenance of the soil 
fertility is considered to be 5 tons of soil loss per acre. Above that 
level of erosion, soil fertility is depleted over time causing a decrease 
in yields. Only some of the rotations included in this study meet the 
maximim permissible erosion requirement. Table 16 shows the percentage 
yield decrease per acre in a six-year period for different rotations at 
different levels of conservation in the soil area considered in this study. 
According to the table those rotations which during the six-year 
period have a 0 percent decrease in yields have a yearly soil loss of 
5 tons per acre or less. It can be seen that most of the eligible rota­
tions in Land A meet the maximum soil erosion requirement. Rotations 
using Land B cause more erosion unless a high level of conservation prac­
tices is employed. 
In agreement with the above, the output coefficients used in pro™ 
gramming the different plans have been adjusted for the decrease in yield 
due to soil erosion.* 
3. Single crops in the short-term model 
A tenant with a limited planning horizon will not plan for the future 
*For sake of simplicity the rate of erosion was presumed to be a 
linear function of time. 
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Table 16. Percentage of per acre yield decrease in a 6-year period 
due to soil erosion 
Land A Land B 
Crop Conservation Conservation 
Rotation None Contour Terrace None Contour Terrace 
COM 0 0 0 1 0 0 
CCOMM 0 0 0 2 2 0 
CCOM 0 0 0 3 3 0 
CSbCOM 1 0 0 5 4 3 
CCC 2 k 0 6 5 4 
Source: David F. Slusher, W. D. Shrader and Frank F. Reicken, Agronomy 
Department, Iowa State University. Private Communication. 1960. 
in terms of crop rotations extended throughout a number of years but 
rather in terms of yearly crops. The reason is that he does not know 
whether or not he will remain on the farm and consequently obtain the 
returns associated with crop rotations. Consequently, yield estimates 
for a farm under a short-term leasing arrangement should be given for 
single crops rather than for rotations contrariwise to those for an 
owner-operated farm or for a rented farm with a long term lease. 
The objective of this study is to compare returns from a long term 
(six years) share-rented farm and those from a farm successively rented 
under three short-term leases of two years each. Therefore, there should 
be three sets of yield estimates for each of the two-year periods covered 
by the three leasing arrangements. 
In Table 18 of Appendix B the per acre yield estimates for different 
crops of first and second year (years k=0 and 1) are presented.* It can 
*The yield estimates of this table and the following ones have been 
adjusted for soil erosion. 
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be noticed that no yield estimates are given for second year corn, C^ , 
at a high level of conservation (terracing). As expressed above the one-
year planning horizon inhibits the tenant from investing in terraces. 
Table 19 in Appendix B provides the per acre yield estimates for 
different crop combinations of third and fourth year during the second 
of the three successive leases. Yield estimates for the last two years, 
which is the duration of the third consecutive lease, are given in 
Table 20 in Appendix B. 
Tables 21, 22 and 23 in Appendix B present as well the fertilizer 
rates applied to the different crops during the three successive lease 
periods. 
4. Labor requirements 
The requirements of direct labor input of hours per day for differ­
ent crops are given in Table 24. 
Table 24. Hours per day of direct labor input required for different crops 
Dec.-Jan. March - May- July- Sept.-Oct. 
Crop Feb. April June August Nov. 
1st year corn .0234 1.0015 2.6005 .2811 1.9504 
2nd year corn .0260 1.1110 2.8847 .3119 2.1635 
Corn following Sb .0247 1.0562 2.7426 .2965 2.0569 
Soybeans after corn .0368 2.4832 2.4202 .1732 .1365 
Oats after corn .2688 1.8819 .5377 .0172 .0000 
Meadow3 .0000 .0000 .6000 .6000 .8000 
Source: (22). 
aDoes not include labor input used in harvesting. 
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As stated before the supply of labor available in all months except 
March-April and May-June is considered non-limiting. 
5. Capital requirements 
The per acre variable production costs in dollars are given in 
Table 26 for different rotations in an owner-operated farm. In a crop-
share rented farm variable costs are split between landlord and tenant 
according to the figures given in Tab je 25. Finally, variable costs for 
different yearly crops are given in Table 26. 
These figures include among the variable costs the expenses on live­
stock equipment which is not included among the fixed costs. The reason 
is that specialized livestock equipment is usually purchased on a farm 
only when there is some enterprise which requires this equipment such as 
hogs or cattle. 
D. Livestock Activities 
In the following paragraphs a brief description of each of the six 
livestock activities considered in this study is offered. These activ­
ities can be divided into two groups including respectively cattle and 
hog enterprises. The details about capital, hay, corn and labor 
requirements are given in Tables 27 and 28 for each of the two groups. 
As stated before an "average" level of management is assumed for 
the computation of input-output coefficients. Resource requirements and 
returns are calculated on the unit basis of one head of cattle enter­
prises and of litters for hog enterprises. 
It is noted that in a crop-share rented farm all costs originating 
Table 25. Per acre yearly variable costs in dollars of different rotations on owner-operated 
farms 
No conservation Contouring Terracing 
Fertilizer: No Low High No Low High No Low High 
COM® 5. ,98 6. 546 8. 026 6. ,092 6. 659 8. 139 7. 489 8. 056 9. 539 
CCOM® 7. 013 7. 638 11. 157 7. 158 7. 783 11. 309 8. ,61 9. 23 12. 76 
CCOMM8 6. 26 6. 76 9. 68 6. ,37 6. 87 9. 86 7. ,85 8. 35 11. 35 
CSbCOMA 8. 013 8. 513 10. 337 8, 183 8. 672 10. 485 9. 189 9. 689 11. 501 
CCOM^  7, .201 7. 856 
J 
10. 617 7. 391 8. 016 10. 784 8, .374 8. 999 11. 767 
CCC^  9, .70 10. 50 18. 23 9, .93 10. 73 18. 46 10. 86 11. 66 19. 39 
Table 26. Per acre annual variable 
tenant and landlord 
costs for different rotations on a crop -share rented farm for 
No conservation Contouring Terracing 
Fertilizer : No Low High x No Low High No Low High 













































































































Table 27. Per unit resource requirements and returns for livestock 
activities 
Good to choice feeder calves fed on pasture (Cattle 1) 
Purchase month October 
Market month October 
Purchase weight lbs. _____ _ 430 
Market weight 1,052 
iiverage daily gain 1.72 
Days on farm 360 
Death loss % of purchase cost 2.5 
Market price 25.00 
Market revenue 1052 lbs. x 25 260.10 
Gross revenue $260.10 
Annual cash expense 
Purchase cost 430 lbs. x $0.27 116.10 
Protein supplement 260 x $0,045 11.70 
Power and equipment 2.45 
Equipment replacement 3.24 
Hay harvest $4.04 per ton 3.64 
Hauling .36 per cwt. 3. 79 
Miscellaneous (1.5% of gross revenue 3.90 
$144.82 
Net revenue $115.28 
Capital requirements 
Annual cash expense - feeder stock 144.82 
Equipment 15.42 
1st year: $160.24 
2nd year: $144.82 
Feed requirements 
Corn (bushel) 52.00 
Hay (ton) .90 
Pasture (130 AVD) 1.56 
Supplement (lbs.) 260.00 
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Table 27 (Continued) 
Good to choice feeder calves fed in dry lot (cattle 2) 
Purchase month October 
Market month September 
Purchase weight 430 
Market weight 1030 
Average daily gain 1.76 
Days on farm 340 
Death loss % of purchase cost 2.5 
Market price 25.00 
Market revenue - 1030 lbs. x $1.25 $254.60 
Gross revenue $254.60 
Annual Cash Expense 
Purchase cost 430 lbs. x $0.27 116.10 
Protein supplement 260 lbs. x $.045 11.70 
Power and equipment 2.45 
Equipment replacement 3.24 
Hay harvest .7 x $4.04 2.83 




Net revenue $110.75 
Capital Requirements 
Annual cash expense 143.85 
Equipment 14.67 
1st year: $158.52 
2nd year: $143.85 
Feed Requirements 
Corn (bushels) 60.00 
Hay (tons) • 70 
Pasture (AVD) 
Supplement (lbs.) 260 
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Table 27 (Continued) 
Choice yearling steers (cattle 3) 
Purchase month October 
Market month June 
Purchase weight 621 
Market weight 1121 
Average daily gain 2 
Days on farm 250 
Death loss 7. or purchase cost 1 
Market price 24.00 
Market revenue - 1121 lbs. x .24 267.49 
Gross revenue $267.49 
Annual Cash Expense 
Protein supplement 250 x .045 11.25 
Purchase cost 621 x .25 155.25 
Power and equipment 2.30 
Equipment replacement 2.62 
Hay harvest 1 x 4.04 4.04 
Hauling 11.32 x .35 3.96 
Miscellaneous 4.11 
$183.53 
Net revenue $ 83.96 
Capital Requirements 
Equipment 14.67 
Annual cash expense 183.30 
1st year: $197.97 
2nd year : 183.30 
Feed Requirements 
Corn (bushels) 55 
Supplement (lbs) 250 
Hay (tons) 1 
Pasture (tons) 
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Table 27 (Continued) 
Medium yearling steers (cattle 4) 
Purchase month November 
Market month April-May 
Purchase weight 670 
Market weight 1030 
Average daily gain 2 
Days on farm 180 
Death loss % of purchase cost 0.5 
Market price 22.00 
Market revenue - 1030 x .22 225.96 
Gross revenue $225.96 
Annual Cash Expense 
Purchase cost 670 lbs. x .19 127.30 
Protein 150 x .045 6.75 
Power and equipment 3.40 
Equipment replacement 3.68 
Hay harvest 1.6 x 4.04 6.47 
Hauling 10.30 x .35 3.60 
Miscellaneous 3.39 
$154.59 
Net revenue 71.37 
Capital Requirements 
Equipment 




Corn (bushels) 37 
Supplement (lbs.) 150 
Hay (ton) 1.6 
Pasture (30 PUD) tons of hay 0.36 
Source: (15) The coefficients were adjusted after consultation with 
Everett Stoneberg, Extension Service, Animal Husbandry Department, 






Table 28. Per unit resource requirements and returns for hog enter­
prises 
Spring pigs (1:0). Average management (hogs 1) 
Number of pigs weaned per unit 7.30 
Death loss after weaning 0.10 
Replacement gilts kept 1.08 
6.12  
6.12 pigs x 240 lbs.: 1468 x 15.00 ,, $220.32 
Sow - 350 lbs. (average) 15.50 54.25 
Gross returns $274.57 
Feed Fed 
Corn (bushels) 105.446 
Hay (tons) .018 
Pasture (29.380 PVD) tons .352 
Protein supplement cwt. 7.192 
Annual Cash Expense 
Supplement 7.192 x 0.55 39.56 
Boar charge 2.50 
Equipment use 5.80 
Power and machinery 5.88 
Hauling 1.00 
Veterinary, electricity, miscellaneous 4.70 
Hay harvesting costs .018 x 4.04 .73 
$60.17 
Capital coefficient 1st year 
Gilt 39.00 
Equipment (% cost of new equipment 
per unit) 20.87 
Capital Coefficient 2nd year $ 60.17 
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Table 28 (Continued) 
Spring and fall pigs (1:1) average management (hogs 2) 
Number of pigs weaned per unit 14.60 
Death loss after weaning 0.30 
Replacement gilts kept 0.83 
13.57 
13.57 pigs of 230 lbs. 
1560 lbs. x 17.00 $265.20 
1560 lbs. x 15.00 234.00 
Sow - 300 lbs. (July-January x 14.40 43.20 
Gross returns $542.40 
Feed Fed 
Com (bushels) 202.824 
Hay (tons) 0.031 
Pasture (31.300 AVD) tons 0.376 
Protein supplement cwt. 14.601 
Annual Cash Expense 
Supplement 14.601 x 5.5 $ 80.31 
Boar Service 4.50 
Power and machinery 9.36 
Equipment use 13.42 
Hauling $.068 per cwt. 2.12 
Veterinary, electricity, miscellaneous 12.48 
Hay harvesting costs .031 x 4.04 1.25 
$123.44 
Capital Coefficient 1st Year 
Breeding females 45.42 
Equipment (% cost of new equipment per unit)_ 39.89 
$208.76 
Capital Coefficient 2nd Year 
Source: The coefficients were adjusted after consultation with Everett 
Stoneberg, Extension Service, Economics Department and Thomas 
Wickersham, Extension Service, Animal Husbandry Department, 
Iowa State University of Science and Technology. (22). 
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from livestock enterprises are born by the tenant. The latter receives 
as well all the benefits coming from these enterprises.* 
1. Good to choice feeder calves fed on pasture 
Good to choice calves are bought at weights of about 430 pounds. 
They are wintered on roughage and some grain and in the spring they are 
put to pasture for 130 days. They are fed to attain grade choice in 
the October market. Market weight averages 1052 pounds per head sold 
with a death loss of 2.5 percent of purchase weight. 
2. Good to choice feeder calves fed in drylot 
Good to choice feeder calves are purchased in October at weights 
about 430 pounds. They are wintered on roughage and some grain and put 
on full drylot feed in June. They are fed out to grade choice and 
marketed in September weighing an average of 103- pounds per head sold. 
Death loss is 2.5 percent of purchase weight. 
3. Choice yearling steers 
Choice yearling steers are purchased in October at weights of 621 
pounds. After having been wintered on roughage and some grain, they are 
put on full drylot feed in early spring. Grade choice steers are market­
ed in June. Market weight is about 1121 pounds per head sold and death 
loss is estimated as 1 percent of purchase weight. 
4. Medium yearling steers 
Medium yearling steers are purchased at a weight of 670 pounds in 
November and are wintered on roughage and limited grain.- They are put 
*This is not the case of livestock-share leases in which both costs 
and returns are shared between landlord and tenant. 
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on full feed in drylot at the end of winter and they are fed out to grade 
good. Market weight is about 1030 pounds per head sold and death loss 
is .5 percent of purchase weight, 
5. One-litter spring hogs (1:0 ratio) 
Pigs are farrowed in April and marketed in November at a weight of 
240 pounds per head. Litters average 7.3 pigs weaned. Pork sold per 
litter including a 350 pound sow averages 1818 pounds. Total feed, 
capital, labor, livestock equipment, building space requirements and 
total returns are calculated on the unit basis of a sow and one litter. 
6. Two-litter spring and fall hogs (1:1 ratio) 
Pigs are farrowed in April and November and marketed in October and 
May at a weight of 230 pounds per head. The two litters average 14.6 
pigs weaned. The amount of pork sold is 3120 pounds, not including a 
300-pound sow. Different resource requirements are calculated on the 
unit basis of a sow and two litters. 
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V. LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM FARM PLANS: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
One of the objectives of this study was to obtain short-term and 
long - term optimal farm plans in order to observe the effect of time on 
resource allocation on a rented farm under different leasing arrange­
ments and also on one operated by the owner. 
This chapter presents in certain detail the empirical results of 
the different optimal plans and thus achieves this objective. The other 
objective of this study was to test some hypotheses about the nature of 
inter-temporal inefficiencies due per se to leasing systems. This 
aspect of the analysis will be taken up in the following chapter. 
A. Optimal Long-Term Plans for a Crop-Share Rented Farm 
Under Customary Leasing Arrangements 
The dynamic model used in obtaining these optimal plans is basically 
the one presented in Figure 5. The number of activities included in the 
empirical situation is considerably greater than that of the model. The 
input-output matrix is of order 54 X 455. A great part of the 455 activ­
ities is formed of crop rotation activities, which as explained in Chapter 
IV, can be at any three levels of conservation and fertilization. 
In determining the optimum combination of enterprises, given the 
restrictions imposed by resources and the goals of the farmer, the ten­
ant's objective row is first maximized at different levels of capital. 
Then at a specific level of capital, i.e., $8,250, the optimum farm plan 
for the landlord is obtained by maximizing his objective function subject 
to the same restrictions as in the case of the tenant. 
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1. Tenant's 6-year optimum plan 
Table 32 gives a summary of the optimum 6-year plan for a tenant-
operated 220-acre farm under customary crop-share lease in southwestern 
Iowa. The level of capital available to the firm amounts to $8,250. Of 
this amount, $3,460 over the 6-year period is contributed by the landlord 
i 
and the rest by the tenant. In the first year, i.e., year 0, the land­
lord contributes $577 and the tenant $6,750. The amount of capital 
resources used for family consumption is taken each year from the capital 
supply. That explains the relatively high level of capital; $4,460 are 
required each year for family consumption and other fixed costs. 
In the second year, the tenant's returns are reinvested in the firm. 
In this year, the tenant's capital is $4,854, $3,891 coming from the pre­
vious year's returns and the remainder from the initial contribution of 
2 $1,050. The amount of capital invested in the following years is given 
in detail in Table 32. It can be noted that capital supply does not 
increase smoothly over time. The reason can be attributed to the model 
which is set in such a way that it does not include a yearly hay selling 
activity but only in odd years. This explains the apparently erratic 
changes in capital supply and also in total returns. 
The crop rotations at the levels given in Table 32 for the 6-year 
period on Land A and B are the crop combinations which maximize the total 
returns in year 5 subject to meeting the restraing of family living and 
*The tenant contributes $6,750 in year 0, $1,000 in year 1, 
$1,102.50 in year 2 and $572 in year 3. All this amounts to $9,000 
discounted to its present value in year 0. 
2 The discrepancy is due to rounding errors. 
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other fixed costs. It is interesting to observe the pattern of resource 
allocation in this dynamic framework. Figure 4 gives a graphic summary of 
the rotations included in the optimum plan for the tenant. As before, in 
any crop rotation the capital letters symbolize the different crops, the 
superscript the type of land and the subscripts the level of fertiliza­
tion, the level of conservation and the year the rotation is started. 
For instance, CCOM4. 1 n is a 4-year corn-corn-oats-meadow rotation 
* 9 A 
starting in year 0 at a high level of fertilization and at a low level of 
conservation (contouring). This rotation uses up almost the total 60 acres 
supply of Land A. The other two rotations included in year 0 use up the 
supply of Land B. COM8^  ^  q takes 15.2 acres and COM8^  g Qtakes 144.6 
acres. These two enterprises are the same except for the fact that the 
first uses only contouring as a conservation practice whereas the second 
uses terraces. 
It can be seen in Figure 7 that as capital increases over time the 
number of crop rotations using a high level of conservation also 
increases. For instance in year 4 practically all of Land B is terraced, 
CCOM8. 0 - and COM8- - - coming in at a high level of conservation. Even 
A in Land A, CCC w w ^  comes into the plan at a high level of conservation. 
It sould be remembered that Land A has a slope of 1-5% which usually does 
not require terracing. These results show, however, that if soil deplet­
ing rotations such as continuous corn are grown, terracing becomes profit­
able in that type of land when there is ample capital available. 
The livestock enterprises included in the tenant's optimum plan con­
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Figure 7. Optimal combination of crop rotations in the tenant's six-
year plan 
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and only in the last year is the livestock building space capacity of the 
farm exhausted. In the year 5, a new livestock enterprise, choice yearling 
steers, comes into the plan. This enterprise does not require any building 
space and the only resources which can limit it are capital, labor and 
forage. 
Among other activities which appear each year in the tenant's plan is 
family living which includes the yearly family consumption and certain 
added fixed costs.* A corn selling activity appears in years 1, 2 and 3. 
In year 0, no corn is sold because all is fed to livestock. In years 4 and 
5, additional corn is bought because corn becomes the limiting resource for 
livestock activities. 
Hay transfer is an activity selected in years 0, 2 and 4 of the opti­
mum plan. Only in years 1, 3, and 5 is hay selling present. The non-
inclusion of a hay selling activity in the even years could be justified 
by the fact that the hay market is rather imperfect in many rural locali­
ties. 
The last column of Table 32 gives the yearly discounted returns for 
both landlord and tenant. It can be noticed that these increase through 
time although not in a monotonie way. The reason as expressed above is 
that the inclusion of a hay selling activity only in odd years produces, 
like in years 2 and 3, the jerks in the growth of total returns. Besides, 
since returns are discounted to the present value in year 0, it happens 
that an increase in returns in money terms for a specific year may appear 
*The detail is given in Table 4. 
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like a decrease in money terms of year 0. This is more true, the higher is 
1 
the discount rate. 
The relatively higher level of profit of the last year can be ex­
plained by the fact that in that year discounted total returns include not 
only the returns of crops produced and sold within that year but also the 
discounted returns of crops sold at the beginning of the following year. 
2. Landlord's optimum 6-year plan 
A summary of a landlord's optimum plan for the same farm situation 
examined in the previous paragraph is presented in Table 33. It can be 
noticed that the operating capital is the same in this plan, the land­
lord's optimum plan, and the above tenant's plan. That is, the total 
operating capital available to the firm is $8,250 not including the amount 
available for family consumption in the first year. In that same year, 
the landlord contributes $577 and the tenant $6,750, the same level of 
capital as in the tenant's optimum plan. This permits comparison of the 
two plans. 
The choice of rotations is illustrated in Figure 8. The pattern 
differs somewhat from the tenant's optimum plan. First, the rotations 
included in the landlord's plan are generally the same except that CCC, 
continuous corn, comes into the plan much earlier (year 1). In the ten­
ant's optimum plan, continuous corn appears only in the last two years and 
in a limited extension. 
Second, in the first year 10.8 acres of Land A are left in disposal, 
• 1 
*In this study a 5% rate of interest was used. 
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i.e., left in permanent pasture or rented out. In this respect it is 
important to point out that our model does not admit continuous corn for 
more than five successive years. A 5-year continuous corn rotation can be 
started only in the second year. 
Thirdly, in the last two years all of Land A and B is terraced, 
whereas in the tenant's optimum plan approximately 55 acres of rotation 
Land A used contouring but not terracing. 
The livestock enterprises are reduced to 2-litter hogs only. It can 
be noticed that in this plan comparatively less resources are diverted to 
livestock than in the tenant's plan. 
The other activities included in the landlord's plan are the same as 
in the tenant's except for corn selling which replaces corn buying in the 
last two years. The reason is that the crops selected have a higher pro­
portion of corn than in the tenant's plan. Besides, the level of live­
stock activities is lower in this plan than in the tenant's and therefore 
less corn is fed to the cattle. 
The last year returns are higher for the landlord relative to the 
tenant's plan (Figure 9). Here, total returns for the landlord are 
$6,770 against $5,908 and for the tenant $11,438 against $12,275 in the 
tenant's optimum plan. Total returns for the firm are approximately the 
same for the two plans: $18,208 in the landlord's optimum plan against 
$18,183 in the tenant's optimum plan. 
Figure 6 gives an idea of the level of discounted returns of alter­
native plans in every year of the 6-year plan. 
It can be observed here that the difference in returns between the 
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landlord's and the tenant's optimal plans can be attributed to intra-
temporal inefficiencies due per se to leasing systems. In effect, custom­
ary crop-share leases violate incentive conditions one and two, fact which 
accounts for the difference in returns between the two optimal plans. 
Since we are not specifically interested in this type of inefficiencies 
but rather in inter-temporal ones, we will not give more time to this sub­
ject. 
However, it can be mentioned here that if intra-temporal inefficien­
cies were to be measured, the returns from these plans and those from 
similar plans under a "perfect lease" should be compared. The difference 
in discounted returns between the two set of plans could be then attributed 
to intra-temporal inefficiencies caused per se by leasing arrangements. 
B. An Optimum Long-Term Plan for an (Xmer-Operated Farm 
Table 34 gives a summary of the optimum 6-year plan for an owner-
operated 220-acre farm in southwestern Iowa. This program which follows 
/ 
the model presented in Chapter III was run under the same restrictions as 
those for the tenant-operated farm. The only difference is that the operat­
ing capital available is higher than in the other two plans.* 
The crop rotations included in this plan are only two: corn-corn-oats-
meadow for Land B (CCCMB2,2,0 30(1 CC0mB2,2,4) 311(1 continuous corn for Land A 
(CCCCC^ 2 2 p- It can be seen that these two rotations are used at a high 
*The reader is referred to Chapter II in which the difficulties of 
comparing a dynamic owner-operator ' s optimum plan and a tenant ' s optimum 
plan are discussed. 
Figure 9. Landlord's and tenant's discounted total returns in the 
six-year tenant's and landlord's optimal plan 
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level of fertilization and conservation (terracing). 
Continuous corn comes into the optimum plan only in the second year. 
In year 0 all Land A is in disposal. This means that it is more profit­
able for the tenant to allocate his capital to livestock enterprises in 
the first year, rather than to crop enterprises other than continuous 
1 
corn. 
Hog activities appear at a high level since the first year. In the 
second year, the livestock building space is exhausted and excess of 
capital is invested outside of the farm. This is indicated by the inclu­
sion of a capital selling activity in year 1. According to Table 34, 
$549 are invested outside the farm in this year. 
In year 3, a new livestock enterprise comes into the plan: medium 
yearling steers.^  This activity does not consume any building space. 
In year 4, it attains a level of 20 units which is not surpassed 
the next year. The reason is that then the labor resources become limit­
ing. Hence, the investment for the excess capital in the last two years 
is exclusively channelled through the capital selling activity which 
attains the level of $22,518 in the last year. 
Discounted total returns increase consistently from $9,458 in the 
first year to $36,668 in the last year. 
*The model does not permit continuous corn starting in year 0. 
2 The model does not permit this activity to come into the plan 
before year 3. 
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C. Three Consecutive Two-Year Optima Plans 
for a Tenant-Operated Farm 
One of the objectives of this study was to program three conse­
cutive optima plans for the same tenant-operated farm in Southwestern 
Iowa used in the long-term optima plans presented above. The crop 
restrictions imposed by share leasing arrangements are identical to 
those of the long-term plans. Thus, it will become possible to compare 
the tenant's long-term optimum plan with the consecutive short-term 
plans in order to detect inter-temporal inefficiencies in resource allo­
cation. In the first situation the tenant has a supposedly adequate plan­
ing horizon whereas in the second one he has a planning horizon limited 
to two years. 
All the programs presented below follow the dynamic programming 
model presented in Figure 6 of Chapter III. It should be recalled that 
this model has single crops instead of rotations as activities and that 
no second-year activities start at a high level of conservation, i.e., 
with terracing. This is a reasonable assumption since a tenant with 
an expected two-year term on the farm would hardly plan to invest in 
terraces. He would not profit from the latter but rather would his 
successor on the farm. This is a common dissociation of benefits and 
costs. 
1. First and second year optimum plan for a tenant-operated farm 
Table 35 gives the optimum combination of enterprises for the first 
129 






















AmUy 1M% .#*M 
§m 1%*? %& 





k^ m#^ @^ W 8%e@.llttm 9,5 
1,1,0 3#,? 
k«W\g,@ 90,9 








&^# #l#eee#W #w ef A* WW# em h Ë*Md le l#d#W In (Me flpm, 
warn gom m&w a meWay lessbg msosgsxaA la BsaKwtaA ksa 
WW*mdMeq#*9 
MvwW %w BB0W$k9 
RAwef" BbMbg 
W$@ %#e WW gmmwo- WA wWw 
@8g«UtW ,1 WXyllvkg #,%9 




#M km $;,0g3 
&g#@.lltW &g kmwUI* AplWkmm# WW 
9oUyllvi% &%D AglWlmAW 
kmfkgwl WA &mW 
Wku 
WB 
l)7Î^ Fwm& $**&', 1# #5,W la F#* W KM la ?w 1. 
mlklMW&lBWMfN, 
130 
of three consecutive two-year tenant's plans. The crop enterprises 
selected by the tenant in year 0 consist almost exclusively of corn. 
The entire 60 acres of Land A are planted with corn at a high level of 
fertilization but at a low level of conservation (contouring). 
Most of Land B is also allocated to corn enterprises. There are 
B B 68.7 acres of C . . n and 90.9 acres of C . 0 The first activity 
uses a low level of fertilization and conservation. The second activity 
is also at a low level of fertilization but requires terraced land. Other 
g 
activity appearing in this plan in a reduced scale is 0 ^  i q used as a 
nurse crop for meadow. 
Capital is one of the restricting resources for the tenant in year 
0. It is interesting to note that the tenant allocates his capital to 
crops in such a way that Land A, physically more productive, receives 
more fertilizer whereas Land B, which is more subject to soil erosion, 
gets more conservation practices. 
In year 1 all of Land A is planted with soybeans. This does not 
also happen with Land B because some of it, that is 30 acres, is allocated 
to pasture. 
Among the livestock activities there is only one which recurs in all 
plans. This is two-litter hogs which come in at a low level in this 
plan. This activity consumes a high amount of capital and therefore 
competes for it with the crop activities. 
Other activities present in the plan are family living, forced into 
the plan at the same level as in all other plans, and tenant corn buying 
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1 
which is used to feed the livestock. 
The discounted gross returns of the tenant in year 1 are $6,004 
and the landlord's $4,968. The latter include the discounted value of 
the landlord's corn disposal. 
2. First and second year optimum plan for a rented farm maximizing 
the landlord's objective row. 
Table 36 presents the optimum combination of enterprises for the 
same two-year program explained in the last section but with the dif­
ference that here the landlord's objective row is maximized instead of 
the tenant's. The purpose of this program is to point out in passing 
the existence of intra-temporal dissociations in leasing systems. 
The crop activities selected in this plan do not differ much from 
the ones in the previous optimum plan. In year 0 there is a sizable 
amount of land planted with corn. In year 1 the landlord optimizing 
returns of the second year substitutes corn for soybeans. In effect, 
all of Land A is given to corn and part of Land B, that is, 60 acres 
also grow corn. 
A difference that should be noted is that in the landlord's 
optimum plan oats uses only a low level of fertilizer whereas in the 
tenant's optimum plan oats uses a high level of fertilization. The 
reason is that oats under customary sharing arrangements are split be­
tween landlord and tenant in a 40-60 basis. This evidently produces 
intra-temporal dissociations of benefits and costs. 
No corn is produced to be fed in the first year since according 
to the model only oats, i.e., corn equivalent, can be produced and fed 
to the cattle in the same year. 
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A further difference between this plan presented in Table 36 and 
the tenant's in Table 35 is that here no livestock activities come into 
the optimum plan. The landlord who has no interest in those activities 
prefers the tenant to allocate his capital resources to crop activities. 
The level of total returns attained by the landlord in the second 
year is $5,164. In the tenant's optimum plan these returns were $4,968. 
There is a difference in favor of the landlord of $196 detween the 
landlord's discounted returns in the two optima plans. The discounted 
returns for the firm are higher, however, in the tenant's optimum 
plan. In effect, there are $774 more of total returns for landlord and 
tenant in the plan of Table 35 than in the landlord's plan. The reason 
is that the first plan includes livestock activities which have a larger 
return to invested capital. 
3. Third and fourth year optimum plan for a tenant-operated farm 
Table 38 summarizes the optimum plan for the same farm as in the 
previous problems. The tenant's objective funcgion is maximized here. 
These programs are a continuation of the tenant's first and second year 
as presented in Table 35. The tenant's capital supply in year 2 
includes the total returns obtained in year 1. They amount to $6,004. 
Besides the tenant contributes $1,000 in year 2 and $500 in year 3.* 
The land restrictions of this program also depend on the crop activities 
selected in years 0 and 1. 
In year 2 all Land A is dedicated to corn at a high level of fer-
% 
These are exactly the same amounts contributed by the tenant in 
the 6-year plan presented in the first section of this chapter. 
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tilization. Land B has also 130 acres of corn all at a high level of 
conservation. The new crop which comes into this plan is meadow which 
uses 40 acres of Land B. 
In year 3 all the land is under cultivation using a high amount of 
fertilizer. Capital is evidently more abundant in this third year. All 
of Land B is terraced except 40 acres. Land A is not terraced but con­
touring is used to grow corn and soybeans. 
Two-litter hogs come into the plan at a slightly higher level. 
Other activities are tenant's hay selling in year 2 and tenant's corn 
selling in year 3. The landlord's share of corn remains in disposal 
because the program does not maximize his total returns of year 3 but 
rather the tenant's. The value of the landlord's corn disposal is 
credited however, to his total returns. 
The discounted total returns of the tenant in. year 3 are $5,838. 
In year 1 they were $6,004. The landlord's discounted total returns are 
$3,630, considerably lower than in year 1 when they amounted to $4,968. 
4. Fifth and sixth year optimum plan for a tenant-operated farm 
The optimum combination of enterprises for a tenant-operated farm 
is presented in table 38. This plan is also a continuation of the 
tenant's third and fourth year plan. That is the operating capital con­
tributed by the tenant is nothing but the total returns earned in year 3. 
Likewise yields of both Land A and B are-a function of the crops grown 
in the four previous years. 
A brief look at the crop activities selected in this plan indicates 
that in the last two years there is an increase of oats and meadow. In 
year 4 there are 37.3 acres of oats and 82.6 of meadow. In year 5 there 
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are more than 40 acres of oats and 37 acres of meadow. This indicates 
that as capital is becoming more scarce and as returns and yields decrease 
due to the depletion of the soil, activities such as oats and meadow 
which require relatively less capital and suffer less the impact of 
erosion on yields are considered by the tenant. This represents a change 
from his preferences of the first years when mostly corn and soybeans 
were selected in the optimal plans. 
The livestock activities are constituted only by two-litter hog sys­
tems which do not increase in a significant way their scale of operation. 
Other activities included in the optimum plan are hay selling, corn 
selling and, as usual, family living. A new activity which comes into 
the plan is landlord's capital disposal. This happens in the last year 
when the tenant's relatively low level of capital does not provide to the 
landlord enough opportunity of investment in crop activities. 
The level of discounted returns attained by the tenant in year 5 is 
$4,105, almost $2,000 lower than in year 3. The landlord's share of 
$3,630 is also considerably lower than the $4,968 of year 3. 
D. Optimal Long and Short Term Farm Plans with 
Tenant's Variable Capital 
One of the hypotheses to be tested in this study expressed the impor­
tance of the level of capital in intra- and inter-temporal resource 
allocation. The optimal farm plans presented below permit us to gain 
insight into an interesting and somewhat obscure area of research. 
The variable capital programming technique used in this study is 
described in full elsewhere (9, Chapter 8). This method is applied to 
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our dynamic programming model in spite of the computational difficulties 
involved in handling a problem of such magnitude. 
1. A tenant six-year optimum plan with variable capital 
In Table 39 a summary of the most important features of the optimal 
six-year plans for a tenant-operated farm under a crop-share leasing 
arrangement is presented. The same institutional and resource restric­
tions affecting the tenant's six-year optimum plan shown in Section A 
of this same chapter were used in this plan. The activities and input-
output coefficients were also identical to those of that plan. 
The tenant's first year capital is varied from $5,500 to $7,500. 
These amounts do not represent the tenant's total operating capital. 
The latter also includes $1,000 in each of years 1 and 2 and $500 in 
year 3. Therefore, the tenant's total discounted value of operating 
capital is really varied from $7,000 to $9,000. The landlord's capital 
is not varied. It stays fixed at a discounted value of $577 per year. 
A brief inspection of Table 39 reveals that there are activities 
whose level increases in a monotonie way, that is, they increase as cap­
ital is varied until a maximum level determined by resource restrictions 
is attained. This is the case of livestock activities such as 1) two-lit-
ter hog systems appearing each year in most of the plans and 2) medium 
and choice yearling steers. The latter activities which, contrariwise 
to hogs, require no building space, are included in the optimum plan only 
when the livestock building space capacity has been exhausted by the hog 
activities. This happens in the. last years of some plans when hogs 
attain 20 units. This also requires that capital be accumulated over 
time and that there be a rather high level of total operating capital 
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in year 0. For instance, medium yearling steers come into the plan only 
in year 4 and at the highest level of operating capital, i.e., $9,000. 
Choice yearling steers are selected only in year 5 starting at $8,250 
of operating capital. 
Activities like corn selling and corn buying proceed in a different 
way as operating capital increases. Take for instance year 0. Accord­
ing to the model, corn is not sold until the beginning of the next year 
(only oats can be used in year 0) as livestock feed. When capital is 
scarce for the tenant, most of it is allocated to family living and crop 
activities and not much is left for hog enterprises. These activities 
require a considerable amount of capital. Hence, the level of hog activ­
ities is low in year 0, i.e., at $7,000 of capital there are 1.9 units 
of hogs. Only when total operating capital approaches $8,500 does a 
corn buying activity appear in the optimum plan and the level of hog 
enterprises has an opportunity to be increased. 
Corn selling activities are selected in the following five years of 
the $7,000 optimum plan. In all cases, however, the amount of corn sold 
does not increase monotonically as the tenant's operating capital is 
varied. Corn selling usually goes up as capital levels increase and 
after reaching a peak it diminishes and disappears from the optimum plan 
giving way to the corn buying activity. This happens in years 3, 4 and 
5 and is explained by the higher level of livestock activities which 
consume corn in larger amounts. 
The hay selling activity is the only one which remains relatively 
stable as capital is varied. It is not much affected by changes in the 
livestock activities; the latter do not require a large amount of hay. 
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2. The behavior of crop activities with variable capital 
The crop activities are crucial in our study. The impact of plan­
ning horizon on the rate of investment can be assessed mostly through 
them. The variable capital technique offers new information when applied 
in a dynamic framework. The results shown below are of analytical 
interest. 
At the outset it should be said that crop activities act in a dif­
ferent way from all other activities when capital is varied. As the 
latter increases certain crop activities increase their acreage in the 
optimal plan but after arriving at a peak they start to decline until 
they disappear from that plan. For instance, COM  ^  ^ q an<* CCOM  ^ i 4 
as shown in Table 39 proceed in this manner. 
This could be very well explained by the fact that the specific 
crop activity, as capital increases, is substituted by other crop activ­
ity for which the marginal return is higher as expressed in the criterion 
row z.,-d , . However, a surprising finding is that the same crop activ-
JK JK 
ity which went out of the optimal plan at a specific level of capital 
comes in again at a higher level and replaces the activity which in its 
turn had replaced itself when capital was lower. This behavior of crop 
activities is hard to explain. In order to attempt an explanation it is 
necessary to examine the behavior not only of crops but also of all 
other activities. This is what we intend to do in the remainder of this 
section. 
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the behavuor of all crop rotations 
included in the optimal plan at different levels of capital. For con­
venience , let us classify them in "well behaved" and "bad behaved" 
Figure 10, Behavior of Land A rotations as capital is increased in 
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activities. In Land A as shown by Figure 10, CCOM^ . . _, CCOM^ - . , and 
Z>1,U 
Land A disposal in year 4 are "well behaved". The first appears occupy­
ing the same acreage, 60 acres, at all levels of capital. CCOM^ 0 . ^and 
Z > i 1 J 
Land A disposal monotonically decreases as capital increases until they 
disappear from the optimal plan. 
The "bad behaved" activities in Land A are CCOM^  % ^  and CCC^  g 4 
Figure 10 illustrates well how the activities change and displace each 
other as capital increases from $7,800 to $8,750. 
If we use the same criterion to classify the crop activities of 
Land B we find that COM^  g 3' COM*^  2 1» COM^ g 2 4 an<* Lanc* B disposal 
in year 0 are "well behaved" and that COM*^  ^  q and COlf^  2 q are "^ a<^  
behaved" activities. These last two displace each other and come in 
again into the optimum plan in the $8,000 - $8,750 range. 
The fact that the levels of capital of the bad behaved period of 
activities of both Land A and B approximately coincide gives us our 
first hint. The behavior of these activities may be traceable to the 
effect of a common factor or factors. 
If the behavior of other activities in that same range of capital 
is examined, the following appears to be relevant to our problem. Live­
stock activities increase in all years; in years 4 and 5 they reach the 
limit imposed by the restrictions of 20 units of 2-litter hogs; corn 
buying in years 4 and 5 as well as choice yearling steers in year 5 are 
the new activities coming into the optimal plan; all corn selling activ­
ities leave the optimal plan in the range of capital considered. 
All these factors permits us to give a hypothetical explanation of 
the behavior of crop activities as capital increases. The crux of the 
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matter is that as the level of livestock activities increases more capital 
and corn is needed. If the level of capital is varied above $8,000, 
CCC^ 2 2 4 comes into the optimal plan. This activity provides corn in 
year 5 and the hogs can be increased from 13.3 units to 18.9 at the 
$8,000 level of capital. Corn selling in year 5 goes out of the optimal 
plan at the same level. 
A 
However, the new activity CCC _ „ . consumes a large amount of capi-
tal. The balance must be restored by producing more corn and conse­
quently returns in the first four years. Hence the change from COM^  % q 
to COM 9 - n in year 0. Even if the first consumes more capital in year £ y Ù jU 
0 than the second one, this switch of rotations is understandable due to 
the fact that the variable capital row is year 0's capital row and 
therefore more capital is available in the first year. The additional 
corn produced from C0M*L 0 n permits to increase the level of livestock £ y C. jU 
activities in the first four years and consequently raise the capital 
supply in year 4 in order to finance the extra capital investment in 
terraces of CCtA, 2 4-
The introduction of a new activity in year 5, that is choice year­
ling steers, starts a new wave of adjustments in the allocation of capital 
resources. CCC^  ^  ^  which competes for capital with this new activity, 
begins to decline beyond the $8,100 capital level in order to permit the 
A 
activity to come into the optimal plan. The decline of CCC 224 an<* t*ie 
added consumption by yearling steers produces a deficit of corn. Two new 
activities come into the optimal plan in years 4 and 5; corn buying 
activities which balance the corn supply available for livestock. 
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As the level of capital goes beyond $8,500 the more-capital-consum­
ing CCC^ 2 2 4 which had gone out of the optimal plan comes in again 
displacing the less-capital-consuming CCOM^  % 4» The imbalance in capi­
tal in years 4 and 5 is compensated by the gradual disappearance of 
COM®0 0 _ in year 0 and its replacement by C0M^ o .. n. The latter con-
ZjZJU ZjljU 
s times less capital and permits that more of the latter be allocated to 
livestock enterprises which raise the capital supply of years 4 and 5. 
In these last two years as the level of CCC^ „ 9 . increases more corn /, Z jtf 
is available. Consequently in year 4 the corn buying activity starts 
to decline beyond $8,250 of capital because in that year the units of 
hogs do not increase and no extra corn is consumed. In year 5 the corn 
buying activity stays stable because choice yearling steers increase 
constantly at those levels of capital. 
Thus, we have presented a possible explanation for the behavior of 
certain crop rotations in the optimal plans as capital is varied. There 
is no pretention that this is the only explanation. It rather has the 
character of a tentative hypothesis which should be tested by further 
research. 
3. A tenant's two-year optimum plan with variable capital 
Table 40 presents a summary of the main features of an optimal two-
year plan for a tenant under customary crop-share leasing arrangements. 
The same institutional and resource restriction affecting the tenant in 
the two-year optimal plan shown in Table 35, Section C,of this chapter 
were used in this model. However, there are some differences. This is 
a more imperfect model because it possesses less flexibility in the crop 
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crops. Consequently, it does not permit a rotation starting at a 
specified level of fertilization to change in the second year to a higher 
or lower level. 
The tenant's first year capital is varied from $5,500 to $7,500. 
The total level of capital includes $1,000 additional in year 1 for the 
tenant and $577 each year for the landlord. The landlord's capital 
is not varied. 
A brief survey of Table 40 indicates that here as in the previous 
plan with variable capital we have again some crop activities which be­
have in a rather unorthodox way. These are ^ q, ^ q and CB^ ^  q 
in year 0 and Sb^  % ^  ant* 0 1 in year first three are 
illustrated in Figure 13. 
We do not intend to explain the behavior of these activities in the 
same detail as in the previous section. Let us only say that here a new 
factor enters into the picture besides capital and corn. This is labor 
of year 1 which becomes limiting beyond the $6,750 level of capital. 
This explains, we believe, the remarkable shift towards meadow which 
occurs at the higher levels of capital in this plan. 
It is interesting to compare briefly this plan with the correspond­
ing one in Table 35. The level of returns is slightly larger for the 
latter. The crops selected are approximately the same and also the rate 
of fertilization of those same crops. What differs considerably between 
*If we were to compare this plan with the one in Table 35, we must 
look here at the $6,750 level. 
Figure 12. Behavior of Land B crops in two-year tenant's optimal plans 
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I 
the two plans is the amount of terraced land. In the other optimal 
plan 56.8 percent of Land B is terraced, whereas in this plan not a 
single acre is terraced. Only when capital increases crops with ter­
raced land comes into the optimal appear in the optimal plan. 
The significance of these results (as well as the other presented in 
this chapter) with regard to the hypotheses which are tested in this 
study will be considered in the next chapter. 
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VI. INTERPRETATION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Having dealt with other objectives of this study in the previous 
chapter we turn not to one of its major ones, that is, to measure inter­
temporal inefficiencies within a lease and to identify the factors respon­
sible in creating the gap between an ideal situation or norm and the actual 
situation. 
This chapter provides an answer to these questions. In doing so, the 
four hypotheses derived in Chapter II evaluating the theory of leasing 
systems and the state of empirical research in that field will be taken 
one by one. The empirical results shown in the previous chapter provide 
material to test these hypotheses. The economic analysis presented below 
follows the order in which the four hypotheses were presented earlier. 
A. Inter-temporal Inefficiencies in Crop-Share Leases 
The first hypothesis states that an inadequate planning horizon 
engendering uncertainty of tenure, caused by short-term leasing arrange­
ments, produces an inefficient inter-temporal resource allocation and 
affects the nature of profitable investment. In order to measure these 
inefficiencies the level of returns for a farm after a six-year lease con­
tract should be compared with that for the same farm after three consecu­
tive two-year leases. 
According to Table 32 the firm's total discounted returns in the ter­
minal year of the tenant's optimal six-year plan amount to $18,183. Of 
these, $12,275 corresponds to the tenant's returns and $5,908 to the 
landlord's. 
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In Table 38 the firm's total returns in the terminal year of the 
three consecutive tenant's optimal two year plans are $7,556, of which 
$4,105 corresponds to the tenant and $3,451 to the landlord. 
The difference in total returns between the two situations amounts 
to $10,627. This means that a firm operating under a crop-share arrange­
ment with an adequate planning horizon for the tenant obtains $10,627 more 
of discounted returns than a second firm under the same economic and 
institutional restrictions but with a tenant's planning horizon limited 
by the leasing arrangement to a two year period. 
This gap between the two plans can be attributed to inter-temporal 
inefficiencies. If the farmer had a longer term of lease or a compensa­
tion clause for the earning potential of unexhausted investments he would 
have been motivated to allocate his resources in a different manner. We 
can conclude about the situation considered in this study that certainty 
of association of costs and benefits for the tenant permits him to max­
imize his capital and other resources in the long-run after having met 
his yearly consumption needs. 
In Table 41 more detail is given concerning the change over time or 
discounted total returns for both landlord and tenant in each of the situ­
ations described above. It can be seen that in the first year the retuiens 
for the firm - and individually for landlord and tenant - are greater 
under the short-term lease than the longer-term lease. The firm obtains 
that year in the first case $10,239 whereas under a six-year lease it only 
earns $5,263. In the second and third year something similar occurs 
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although the gap between long and short-term leases becomes closer, 
returns in one and other case are $9,880 and $8,847 versus $10,972 and 
$9,203. 
In the fourth year the situation is reversed: the long-term plan's 
returns, $10,760, are slightly higher than those of the short-term ones, 
$9,468. This trend continues in the last two years when the gap between 
the long and short-term plan becomes considerable. 
In Figure 13 the difference in discounted returns for landlord and 
tenant in both plans is illustrated. This figure shows some interesting 
features. For instance, in year 3 there is a noticeable change in the 
trend of the landlord's discounted returns in the short-term plan. For 
the first time the landlord's returns are less than the tenant's. This 
could be explained by the fact that the fertility of the soil has been 
depleted considerable in the first three years and the impact of the 
reduction of yields is felt in the fourth and later years. The tenant's 
returns, however, do not decrease as much because he allocates more 
capital resources to livestock activities which are not affected by the 
decrease in yields of crop rotations. 
In the last year the difference in discounted total returns between 
short and long-term plans is $10,627. This might look too wide a gap 
between the two plans. However, if we consider the assumptions of our 
model, this difference does not seem unjustified. In effect, short and 
long-term plans are discounted for uncertainties by the same risk premium. 
If the longer-term plans were discounted by heavier discount factors than 
short-term plans, then the gap in returns between the two plans would not 
look so great. 
r 
Table 13. Discounted total returns for landlord and tenant's optimal 
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Table 41. Discounted returns over a 6-year period for a tenant with and without adequate planning 
horizon 
Long-term leases Short-term leases Firm's 
Year Landlord's Tenant's Firm's Landlord's Tenant's Firm's Difference 
Discounted total returns Discounted total returns 
0 $1,372 $ 3,891 $ 5,263 $5,181 $5,058 $10,239 -$ 4,976 
1 $4,222 $5,658 $ 9,880 $4,968 $6,004 $10,972 -$ 1,092 
2 $4,029 $ 4,818 $ 8,847 $4,760 $4,443 $ 9,203 - $ 356 
3 $3,869 $ 6,891 $10,760 $3,630 $5,838 $ 9,463 -!-$ 297 
4 $3,668 $ 7,370 $11,038 $3,410 $3,968 $ 7,378 +$ 3,660 
5 $5,908 $12,275 $18,183 $3,451 $4,105 $ 7,556 +$10,627 
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Table 42 gives a summary of the percentage of different crops in 
each year of the optimum plan for a tenant subject to long and short-term 
leases. Inspection of the selection of crops in the two alternative plans 
shows that under short-term leasing arrangements there is a tendency to­
wards soil depletion. The proportion of corn and soybeans is relatively 
greater than that of meadow and oats in short-term leasing arrangements. 
The latter is particularly true for crops grown on Land A. It can 
be noticed that under short-term leases 100 percent of Land A is grown 
with corn or soybeans whereas under a long-term lease only 50 percent of 
the Land A has corn. The remainder of the land under the last type of 
lease is divided in equal proportion between oats and meadow. 
With regard to Land B there is also a tendency under short-term 
leases towards more corn crops than under a long-term lease.^  This is 
particularly true of the first years, because in year 4 the percentage of 
Land B in corn is only 25 percent in the tenant's optimal plan under short-
term leases and 33.3 percent under long-term leases. This, however, 
reverses the trend only for that year. In year 5 again the first type of 
leasing arrangement seems to encourage the cultivation of more corn. 
Thus we can conclude that our first hypothesis can be accepted on 
the basis of empirical results. There is ample evidence that, under the 
assumptions of this inquiry, an inadequate planning horizon on the part 
of a tenant under customary crop-share leasing arrangements produces inter-
*We must not forget that all rotation activities in the long-term 
plan contain oats and meadow. Therefore these results are less signifi­
cant for Land B than for Land A, which has some rotation with a low pro­
portion of oats and meadow or even with nothing but corn. 
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Table 42. Percentage acreage of different crops appearing in tenant's 
optimal plan with adequate and inadequate planning horizon 
Short-term leases Long-term lease 
Year Corn Soybeans Oats Meadow Corn Oats Meadow 
0 Acres 59.9 - - - 30 15 15 
% 100.0 - - - 50 25 25 
1 Acres 60 - - - 30 15 15 
% 100.0 - - - 50 25 25 
2 Acres 60 - - - 30 15 15 
% 100.0 - - - 50 25 25 
3 Acres 9.3 50.7 - - 30 15 15 
% 15.5 84.5 - - 50 25 25 
4 Acres 60 - - - 23.8 18.1 18.1 
% 100.0 - - - 39.7 30.1 30.1 
5 Acres 60 - - - 23.8 18.1 18.1 
% 100.0 - - - 39.1 30.1 30.1 
LAND B 
0 Acres 159.6 - .4 - 53.3 53.3 53.3 
% 99.8 - .2 - 33.3 33.3 33.3 
1 Acres - 129.6 30 .4 53.3 53.3 53.3 
% - 81.0 18.8 .2 33.3 33.3 33.3 
2 Acres 119.9 - - 40 53.3 53.3 53.3 
% 74.9 - - 25 33.3 33.3 33.3 
3 Acres 76.8 - 82.8 .4 53.3 53.3 53.3 
% 48.0 - 51.8 .2 33.3 33.3 33.3 
4 Acres 40.1 - 37.3 82.6 53.3 53.3 53.3 
% 25.1 - 23.3 51.6 33.3 33.3 33.3 
5 Acres 82.6 - 40.1 37.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 
% 51.6 - 25.1 23.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 
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temporal inefficiencies in resource allocation and alters the nature of 
profitable investment. 
B. Effect of Planning Horizon on Investment in 
Fertilizer, Equipment and Conservation Practices 
The second hypothesis states that a tenant with short planning hori­
zon, caused by short-term leases without compensation clauses for unex­
hausted improvements, is not motivated to invest in fertilizer, buildings 
and equipment and in conservation practices. Consequently, the rate of 
investment in the above items should prove lower for such a tenant than 
for one having an adequate planning horizon. ' 
In order to determine whether to accept or reject this hypothesis, 
the results presented in the previous chapter are analyzed further in 
respect to this hypothesis. 
1. Investment in fertilizer in shortt and long-term leases 
To assess the impact of planning horizon on investment in fertilizer 
it was necessary to find an index of fertilizer use. We have considered 
that the most convenient one for our purposes is the percentage of land 
acreage in the optimal plans using a high level of fertilization under 
short and long-term leasing arrangements. Table 43 presents the results 
of our analysis. 
It is interesting to note that the effect of planning horizon on the 
rate of fertilization in Land A is non-existent. In effect, under both 
types of leases the optimal plans provide for a 100 percent of total Land 
A acreage using the highest level of fertilization. This is explained by 
the fact that Land A in the area studied has a slope of 1 to 4 percent and 
Table 43. Investment in fertilizer in optimal tenant's plans with adequate and inadequate 
planning horizon 
Short-term leases Long-term leases 
Land A Land B Land A Land B 
Year Acres Total % Acres Total % Acres^  Total % Acres Total % 
fert. acres fert. acres fert. acres fert. acres 
0 59.9 59.9 100 .4 160 .2 60 60 100 159.9 159.9 100 
1 60 60 100 30.4 160 19.0 60 60 100 159.9 159.9 100 
2 60 60 100 61.4 160 38.4 60 60 100 159.9 159.9 100 
3 60 60 100 160 160 100 60 60 100 159.9 159.9 100 
4 60 60 100 119.9 160 74.9 60 60 100 159.9 159.9 100 
5 60 60 100 157.2 160 89.2 60 60 100 159.9 159.9 100 
&High level of fertilization 
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is quite productive. Hence, the marginal returns of fertilizer are large 
in this type of land and capital is allocated in a preferential way to 
crop activities in Land A which use a high level of fertilization. This 
is true even in the case of tenants with inadequate planning horizon. 
In Land B things occur differently. Here there is a marked differ­
ence in the rate of fertilization investment made by a tenant with ade­
quate or inadequate planning horizon. In the case of the short-term 
lease the percentage acreage at a high level of fertilization is much 
lower than in the case of a long-term lease. This is illustrated by 
Figure 14. The percentage acreage of Land B at a high level of fertili­
zation in the tenant's optimal plan is measured in the vertical axis and 
time in years in the horizontal axis. 
Under a short-term lease the percentage of Land B using a high level 
of fertilization in the optimal plan is only .25 percent in year 0 against 
100 percent in the other type of lease. In the second and third year the 
difference is also quite remarkable: 19 and 38.4 percent versus 100 per­
cent in the two years. Only in year 3 all Land B appears at a high level 
of fertilization in the optimum plan for a short-term leasing arrangement. 
In the last two years 74.9 and 98.2 percent of Land B is highly fertilized 
under a short-leasing optimal plan. Under a long-term lease the optimal 
plan still includes a 100 percent of Land B at high rates of fertilization. 
The above can be explained by the fact that Land B which has a slope 
of 8 to 12 percent is less productive than Land A and therefore the mar­
ginal productivity of capital invested in fertilizer in this type of land 
must be lower than in Land A or than in other activities like livestock. 
Capital resources which are scarce particularly in the first three years 
Figure 14. Percentage acreage of Land B at 
tion in tenant's short and long 
a high level of fertiliza-
term optimal plans 
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are not allocated in great quantities to crop activities grown in Land B 
and therefore these do not come into the optimum plan at a>high level of 
fertilization unless some activities like meadow which consume relatively 
less capital occupy a significant proportion of the total acreage. The 
latter occurs only in the longer-term leasing arrangements as we saw in 
the previous section. In the short-term leases, at least in the first 
years, a much higher proportion of high capital consuming activities like 
corn and soybeans appear in the optimal plan and consequently the use of 
high fertilization rates is done in a much smaller scale. 
We can then conclude that the second hypothesis concerning investment 
in fertilizer is acceptable only with respect to Land B. In Land A the 
rate of fertilization is independent of the length of horizon of the 
tenant.> 
2. Investment in buildings and equipment in short and long-term leases 
Due to the fact that in our models the expansion of fixed resources 
is not considered, we cannot assess the effect of planning horizon on the 
rate of investment in buildings and other fixed equipment. There is one 
exception, however, livestock equipment. In effect our model permits live­
stock equipment to increase over time by the inclusion of a restriction in 
each year except the first.* 
If the optimal six-year plan for the tenant is examined and compared 
to the three consecutive two-year plans for the same tenant, it can be 
inferred that the longer-term leasing arrangement encourages a larger 
*We refer back to Chapter III in which this is explained in detail. 
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investment in livestock equipment than the short-term arrangement. 
The difference in the value of investment in livestock equipment is 
quite remarkable when the two plans are compared. It can be explained 
partly by the fact that in the longer-lease optimal plan more low-capital-
consuming meadow is selected in the first year contributing thus to free 
the scarce capital resources that can be allocated to livestock enter­
prises. In the optimal plans under short-term leasing arrangements most 
of the capital resources are allocated in the first years to high-c apital-
consuming enterprises like corn or soybeans. 
3. Investment in terracing in short and long-term leases 
Investment in terracing as it is affected by the tenant's planning 
horizon can be assessed by the same criterion we have used before in the 
case of fertilizer investments. This criterion is the percentage of 
terraced land in the total acreage of the optimal plans for the tenant 
with short and long-term leases. 
Table 44 presents the percentage of Land A and B which is terraced 
as appearing in the optimal plans for the tenant under short-term leases 
and under a six-year lease. It can be seen from these results that there 
are differences between the two types of leases with respect to percent­
age of terraced land. Under a short-term lease the optimal plan for the 
tenant has 56.8 percent of Land B with terraces in the first year against 
90.4 percent under a long-term lease. The situation remains unchanged 
until the third year when the percentage of Land B with terraces increases 
to 61.6 in the tenant's optimum under a short-term lease. In the fourth 
year this same plan includes 75 percent of Land B terraced whereas the 
six-year plan increases to a 100 percent of Land B with terracing. In the 
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Table 44. Investment in terracing in tenant's optimal plans with 
adequate and inadequate planning horizon 
Short-term lease Long-term lease 
Acres Total % Acres Total % 
Year Terraced Acres Terraced Acres 
Land A 
0 - 60.0 - - 60.0 -
1 - 60.0 - - 60.0 -
2 - 60.0 - - 60.0 -
3 - 60.0 - - 60.0 -
4 - 60.0 - 5.6 60.0 9.3 
5 - 60.0 - 5.6 60.0 9.3 
Land B 
0 90.9 160.0 56.8 144.6 160.0 90.4 
1 90.9 160.0 56.8 144.6 160.0 90.4 
2 98.5 160.0 61.6 144.6 160.0 90.4 
3 120.0 160.0 75.0 159.9 159.9 100.0 
4 157.2 160.0 98.3 159.9 159.9 100.0 
5 160.0 160.0 100.0 159.9 159.9 100.0 
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last two years the percentage of terraced land is practically the same 
for the two leases. 
The short-term optimal plans do not include any crop activity which 
uses terraces in Land A. The long-term optimal plan includes some but 
only in the last two years and in a reduced scale. In year 4 and 5, 
9.3 percent of Land A is cultivated on terraces. 
The characteristics of the terraced percentage of Land A and Land B 
under the two types of leases can be better understood perhaps by means 
of Figure 15 A. It is clear that the rate of investment in terracing 
under the two alternative leasing differs in some respects and in others 
presents certain similarities. 
For instance, the pattern of change over time of terraced land 
assumes a similar form in the two classes: under both types of leases the 
percentage of terraced land increases monotonically over time; both start 
in year 0 at a positive level of terracing; both attain given timç a 100 
percent of total Land B with terraces. The main difference between the 
two classes is the acceleration of the rate of increase of terràced Land 
B over time. In the short-term arrangements the percentage of terraced 
Land B increases at a slower rate than in the six-year leasing arrangement. 
We will consider only in passing the optimum six-year plan for the 
landlord. We find considerable differences between this plan and the 
corresponding six-year optimal plan for the tenant. The percentage of 
Land A which is terraced is quite large as shown in Figure 15 B. In the 
last two years it attains 100 percent of all Land A. This is quite dif­
ferent from the tenant's optimal plan in which there is only 9.3 percent 
of Land A terraced in these two years. 
Figure 15. Percentage acreage of 
plans under short and 
optimal six-year plan 
terraced Land A and B in optimal 
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It can also be noticed that the allocation of resources takes a 
different form in the tenant's six-year optimum and the landlord's. This 
difference in resource allocation is caused, as we have briefly mentioned 
above, by intra-temporal inefficiencies. In a customary crop-share 
lease, among other things, the unequal sharing of products violates the 
second incentive condition. In particular returns of livestock enter­
prises are not shared by landlord and tenant in the same proportion as 
other enterprises like crops. This explains the difference in the rate 
of fertilization and conservation as shown in Figure 15 B and in the 
previous tables. 
We can conclude, with respect to the part of hypothesis two studied 
in this section that short-term leases, that is those limiting the plan­
ning horizon of the tenant, slow down considerably the rate of investment 
in terraces in Marshall soils whose slope is rather steep and which are 
consequently subject to erosion. 
In the case of flat land such as Land A, the effect of an inadequate 
planning horizon on terracing investment seems to be less clear cut. The 
results obtained in this inquiry do not furnish enough evidence in sup­
port of the hypothesis that short-term leases affect significantly the 
rate of investment in terraces in that soil type. Further research could 
clarify this point. 
C. Effect of Capital Resources on the Rate of Investment 
in Fertilizer, Equipment and Terracing 
The third hypothesis states that the relationships between the 
restrictions in the amount of landlord's and tenant's capital supply and 
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the sharing of costs and returns have also an impact on the rate of 
investment of the tenant in fertilizer, building and equipment, and in 
the use of terracing. 
In this section we will examine the different parts of this hypothe­
sis. The relationships between the landlord and tenant's capital and 
the sharing of costs and returns will be considered in the light of the 
empirical results of our dynamic models. Then, the impact of a change in 
the tenant's capital supply of the first year on the rate of investment 
\ 
in fertilizer and conservation practices will be analyzed. 
1. Landlord and tenant's capital in relation to sharing of costs and 
returns: its impact on the rate of investment over time 
That the amount of the tenant's and landlord's capital supply in 
relation to the sharing of costs and returns has an impact on economic 
efficiency has already been established by other studies like the Heady-
Egbert and the Timmons-De Benedictis (13, 5). These studies have shown 
that the dissociations of costs and benefits engendered by certain custom­
ary clauses of crop-share leases, e.g., the sharing of oats in a 60:40 
basis while other crops are shared in a 50:50 basis, etc., produce infra­
temporal inefficiencies in resource allocation. 
These studies, however, have not assessed the impact of these cus­
tomary provisions in a dynamic framework, that is over time. A way of 
doing so is provided by the optimal plans presented in the previous chap­
ter. In particular, the two first six-year optimal plans for the tenant 
and the landlord should be examined (Tables 32 and 33). 
It is important to keep in mind that the level of capital is fixed in 
these two optimal plans. The landlord contributes $3,460 in the six-year 
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period and the tenant $8,250 including there the amount for family con­
sumption. The conclusions which we may obtain from this analysis are 
therefore only applicable to situations comparable to those of the optimal 
plans not only in terms of physical and institutional restrictions but 
also in terms of the capital level selected for the above mentioned plans. 
This level of capital, it could be said in passing, is perhaps a little 
above the average one for farms in the area of our study. 
Figures 15 A and B show how these two plans differ with respect to 
investment in terraces. There is a higher proportion of Land A with 
terraces in the landlord1 s optimum than in the tenant1 s 
A second difference between the two plans is the proportion of the 
different crops selected. In the tenant's optimal plan there is much more 
land in oats and meadow than in the landlord's optimal plan. This effect 
seems to be accentuated over time. For instance, Land A in the last two 
years has a 100 percent of corn whereas in the tenant's optimal plan it 
has only 39.7 percent. The remainder of Land A is in the last plan 
occupied by oats and meadow in equal proportion. 
A third difference between the landlord and tenant's optimum lies 
in the investment over time in livestock enterprises. For instance, in the 
last year the landlord's optimal plan includes 20 units of 2-litter hogs 
and the tenant's optimal plan includes the same number of hog units plus 
7.9 units of yearling steers. 
All the above differences in resource allocation between the two 
optimal plans can be attributed to lease-engenered intra-temporal ineffi­
ciencies. The first and second differences between the two optimal 
plans are caused by violations of the first and second incentive conditions. 
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The customary sharing of oats and meadow are responsible for these 
inefficiencies. The third difference can be attributed to the unequal 
sharing of livestock products and other products as stipulated by the 
customary crop-share lease. Costs and returns in livestock enterprises 
are completely the concern of the tenant while other costs and returns 
of other products are shared by landlord and tenant. 
The shift over time in the allocation capital resources in the 
tenant's optimal plan towards more oats and meadow and in the landlord's 
optimal plan towards more corn and soybeans, seems to indicate that lease-
engendered intra-temporal inefficiencies are accentuated over time. The 
net effect over time of these inefficiencies appears to be a decrease in 
the rate of investment in terraces for Land A, that is for flat Marshall 
soils of good fertility. 
In the case of livestock enterprises, the net effect of over time 
intra-temporal inefficiencies appears to be an increasement in the tenant's 
rate of investments 
2. Effect of increase in tenant's operating capital in the rate of 
investment in fertilizer, equipment,and terracing 
The acceleration of the rate of investment in fertilizer, equipment 
and conservation practices is usually considered a function of capital. 
This is true but requires several qualifications in the case of a tenant-
operated farm under customary crop-share leasing arrangements. The rather 
surprising results of the two sets of optimal plans with tenant's variable 
capital presented in Section D of the last chapter have established this 
fact. 
From these plans (Tables 39 and 40) it can be asserted that only in 
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the case of livestock equipment the rate of investment is a monotonie 
increasing function of capital. In the case of investment in fertili­
zation the statement seems less warranted by the empirical results al­
though at high levels of capital it seems also to be true. In the case 
of terracing the empirical results do not show very clearly which is the 
relation between capital and the rate of investment. 
The two-year optimal plan with tenant's variable capital shows that 
the percentage acreage under high fertilization seems to change upwards 
and downwards as capital varies. In more technical terms as capital 
increases and a new corner of the transformation curve is attained there 
is a reshuffling of resources that makes some activities come into the 
plan, stay there as capital increases, disappear from the plan when other 
activity with higher marginal revenue replaces them and finally come back 
again into the plan as capital increases further. Figure 12 illustrates 
this point in the case of CB2,I,0' ^ 2,1,0 and G 1,1,0; From these re" 
suits it is difficult to establish the true nature of the effect of capital 
on fertilizer investment. The six-year optimal plan does not give much 
information because most of the rotation activities appear at a high rate 
of fertilization at all levels of capital considered. 
There is a similar situation with regard to terracing: the six-year 
optimal plans with tenant's variable capital showin in Table 36 do not 
indicate a clear trend in the investment in terraces when capital is 
increased. Activities like COM*^  g Q which require terraces come into 
the optimal plan and then are displaced by activities like COM6- 1 n 
which do not require terracing as shown on Figure 11. It is true that at 
the highest levels of capital the trend in the two plans with variable 
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capital hints towards more conservation (particularly in the six-year 
plan). It could happen, however, that at other levels of capital for the 
tenant and for the landlord this trend could be reversed or at least 
slowed down. 
We can conclude from the above analysis that the hypothesis about 
the effect of capital on the rate of investment in fertilizer, equipment 
and terracing is not completely acceptable on the basis of our empirical 
results. It is acceptable for the case of investment in livestock equip­
ment. In the other two cases more research is needed in order to under­
stand better the effect of capital on inter-temporal allocation of 
resources. 
What appears clear however is that the rate of investment in conser­
vation practices and particularly in terraces is not a function, given 
the restrictions of this study and the price relationships, only of capi­
tal resources but also of the availability of other resources like corn, 
labor and land of different qualities, all of which are closely related to 
the profitability of livestock enterprises in a crop-share lease. The 
interrelationships between all these resources and capital, insofar the 
tenant maximizes returns of the terminal planning year, seem to determine 
the pattern of investment in terracing over time. 
D. Increase in Efficiency in Crop-Share Leases 
The last hypothesis states that if the previous hypotheses are 
accepted a customary crop-share lease could increase inter-temporal and 
intra-temporal efficiency by (a) adequate planning horizon assured by 
longer-term leases or in its defect by provisions in the lease of compen­
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satory payments to the tenant according to the earning power of his unex­
hausted resources (b) by a better sharing of capital contributions of 
both landlord and tenant, and (c) by modification in the quantity of 
resources contributed by the two parties and in the sharing of products 
between them. 
In reality this hypothesis is not directly tested by the empirical 
research undertaken in this study. It is a conditional hypothesis because 
its recommendations or suggested remedies to intra-temporal and inter­
temporal inefficiencies caused per se by leasing systems have only 
relevance if the previous hypotheses, particularly the first and the 
third one, have proven to be acceptable on the evidence of the empirical 
results. 
The first hypothesis was accepted on the basis of our results and 
it established that inter-temporal inefficiencies in customary crop-share 
leases were considerable in the situation studied. If these inefficiencies 
exist the way to eliminate them is by assuring the tenant association of 
costs and benefits. This would be obtained by providing him with longer-
term contracts or, in the case of a short-term lease, by stipulating in 
the contract that he will be adequately compensated for the potential 
productivity of his investments in case of cessation of contract. 
The second and third part of this last hypothesis aims at reducing 
intra-temporal inefficiencies which may be accentuated over time. An 
unequal sharing of expenses may produce inefficiencies as was established 
in the previous section. A way of avoiding these inefficiencies is sug­
gested, namely a different and flexible basis in the sharing of expenses 
and consequently of products between landlord,, and tenant according to 
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their financial capabilities. A periodical valuation of the resources 
contributed by each party and negotiation on the proportions of returns 
going to each party should prove successful to lessen the observed infra­
temporal inefficiencies. This was discussed in certain detail in Chapter 
II, Section D, and its application and further testing seems to be war=" 




VII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. Summary of This Inquiry 
The first objective of this study was to develop a method of dynamic 
linear programming that permits the introduction of t years of activities 
and restrictions (t = 0, .... , n) in order to observe the effect of time 
on resource allocation in farms operated under different tenure systems. 
A dynamic model was articulated which (a) meets the goals or ends-
in-view of the agricultural entrepreneur, that is, maximization of total 
returns of the terminal year of his planning period; and (b) allows for 
a fixed yearly amount of family consumption. In particular, model for 
owner-operated farms and for crop-share rented farms under short and long-
term leasing arrangements were presented in detail. 
To this effect, a theoretical analysis of the Hicksian theory of the 
firm when applied to an agricultural set-up was made. A review of the 
main contributions to the theory of leasing systems followed by certain 
dynamic qualifications was presented. ' From this analysis a set of four 
hypothesis was obtained. These hypothesis were to be tested by results 
coming from an application of a dynamic model to an empirical case situa­
tion. 
The next step of this study was to apply the dynamic model developed 
to a farm situation in order to assess the impact on economic efficiency 
of uncertainty of tenure caused by short-term leases. The farm selected 
for study as typical of the Marshall soil area of southwestern Iowa has 
220 acres of tillable land of which 60 acres have 1 to 4 percent slope 
and the remainder 160 acres, 8 to 12 percent slope. Most of the resource 
and institutional restrictions were derived from the MINK data, a survey 
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undertaken by the North Central Regional Land Tenure Committee, the United 
States Department of Agriculture, the Farm Foundation and four cooperat­
ing states, Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska and Kansas. The yield and fertilizer 
estimates were furnished by the Agronomy Department, Iowa State University. 
Likewise, information about livestock enterprises was provided by the 
Extension Service at Iowa State University. In the statistical phase of 
the study the Statistical Laboratory of the above-mentioned university 
cooperated. 
A set of optimal farm plans for different tenure situations was 
obtained. These include six-year ex-ante optimal plans for owner-opera­
tors, landlords and tenants, employing alternative levels of fertilization, 
conservation and livestock investment. It is assumed that a six-year 
planning horizon is adequate for a tenant under a crop-share lease. Also, 
a set of three optimal and consecutive two-year plans covering the same 
period of time as the previous six-year plans is obtained. 
Another series of tenant's six and two-yeat plans with variable 
capital is obtained. All the above results permits to study the effect of 
time on resource allocation. It can be seen that the optimal combination 
of enterprises is not the same under different tenure systems. 
Also the impace of customary leasing arrangements on inter-temporal 
efficiency is analyzed. This is done by testing the four hypotheses 
derived from economic theory and from previous empirical results. The 
first hypothesis states that inter-temporal inefficiencies are attribut­
able to the tenant's limited planning horizon in customary crop-share 
leasing arrangements. This hypothesis is accepted on the basis of the 
empirical results. The latter indicate that a tenant under short-term 
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leases, which are common in the area studied, attains a considerably lower 
level of returns in the long-run than a tenant under a longer-term leas­
ing arrangement. 
The second hypothesis states that inadequate planning horizon for 
the tenant causes (a) a decrease in the rate of fertilizer application, 
(b) a decrease in the rate of investment in equipment and (c) a decrease 
in the rate of investment in conservation practices such as terracing. 
The results show that (b) is true in the case of livestock equipment. 
They further show that (a) and (c) are also acceptable in the case of the 
steeper soils. In flatter lands, however, the results do not indicate a 
clear difference between long and short-form leases. 
The third hypothesis talks about the effect of the relative contri­
butions of capital of landlord and tenant on the rate of investment. On 
the one hand, there is evidence that intra-temporal inefficiencies caused 
by inadequate sharing arrangements between landlord and tenant tend to be 
accentuated over time. On the other hand, results coming from the tenant's 
optimal plans at different levels of capital show that only in the case 
of livestock equipment investment is a monotonie increasing function of 
capital. In the case of fertilizer and terracing no clear relation 
between their rate of investment and the capital resources of the tenant 
is established. More research is needed to better understand the role of 
capital in inter-temporal allocation of resources. 
The last hypothesis, conditioned to the acceptance of the three pre­
vious hypotheses, suggests some possible ways to remedy inter-temporal in­
efficiencies in leasing arrangements and also intya-temporal inefficiencies 
which are accentuated over time. The remedies are (a) adequate planning 
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horizon assured by longer-term leases or by agreements satisfactory to 
both parties of compensating the tenant for potential earnings of improve­
ments in case of cessation of contract, (b) a better sharing of expenses 
between landlord and tenant and (c) modification in the quantity of 
resources contributed by the two parties and in the sharing of products 
between them. ^ 
B. Recommendations for Further Research 
This last section endeavors to give some recommendations for further 
research using our models and extending the results obtained in this 
study. In particular, the stress will be made, firstly, on the refine­
ments of methods and, secondly, in the possibility of improving and com­
plementing the results. 
1. Improving the methods 
When dealing with problems of such magnitude as the ones seen in this 
study, the greatest difficulties aee perhaps computational ones. It be­
comes then important to profit from the experience of previous research 
in order to simplify the computations and reduce the costs. 
In this respect some recommendations can be made after completion of 
this study. What appears evident is that the simplex method needs some 
adaptations if we want to handle matrices of large dimensions. There are 
two or three ways of avoiding at least in part the excessive number of 
iterations that would occur if the electronic computer was left to run 
free, that is, using the ordinary criterion of selecting all the z^ " 
d . -,001. jk 
The first way of avoiding excessive iterations consists of changing 
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the criterion used in the program to select the incoming activities. For 
instance, it is possible to start running the problem by selecting only 
those columns with z^ " d^ - 10 or even a higher negative figure if 
some disposal activity with a large -M value has been forced into the 
plan (e.g. family living). As the number of iterations decreases the 
criterion can again be changed this time downwards. This procedure is 
repeated until the regular value of -.001 is used and the optimal feasible 
solution is obtained. 
Another way of avoiding excessive iterations is to use a-priori 
economic knowledge in obtaining the solution. If the researcher knows 
from previous experience that certain activities will never come into the 
optimal plan it pays in terms of time and money to simply eliminate them. 
For instance, in the long-term plans obtained in this study there is not 
a single crop activity coming into the optimal plan at a low level of 
fertilization or conservation. If more problems would be undertaken with 
regard to the same or similar empirical situations this fact should be 
kept in mind. 
Another way of using a-priori economic knowledge consists of select­
ing a specific combination of crops and other activities which constitute 
in an economic sense a feasible solution. This solution even if not the 
optimal provides a basis which becomes a good starting point for arriving 
at the optimum. There is a method of preselecting by row and column in 
a computer a certain basis or plan which is successful in certain cases. 
From this plan sometimes only few iterations are needed to attain the 
optimum. 
The procedure outlined above has the advantage of reducing rounding 
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errors which may become serious if the number of iterations is sufficient­
ly large. The accuracy of the results depends also on the coding. In 
this respect our experience is that the coding of the input-output 
coefficients, which are required to approach 1 in the program used for 
the IBM 650 of our study, does not have a great impact in the accuracy 
of the results. The coding of the Pq column, however, seems to have quite 
an effect on accuracy. With this respect the accuracy of the six-year 
plan for an owner-operator and for a tenant can be compared. The first 
plan, which was obtained first, is much less accurate due to the coding 
of the P by 1/1000. The second was coded only by 1/10 and gave more 
satisfactory results with respect to accuracy. In subsequent problems 
the PQ'S were not coded even if this produced some complications due to 
overflows. 
Finally, a point which should be stressed is that a good method of 
checking the coefficients may avoid time and money. A single error in 
the coefficients may oblige the researcher to run again a complete program. 
2. Extending the results of this research 
There are considerable possibilities of applying the models presented 
in Chapter III to different empirical situations that is to different soil 
areas and institutional restrictions in this and other countries. 
In the case of the MINK data from which was drawn the bulk of the 
information used in our study, it could be possible to extend the same 
model to different soil areas of the four states included in the survey. 
As a complement to our research a more comprehensive study of the effect 
of tenant's variable capital on resource allocation over time could be 
undertaken. In particular, the impact on the ra^e of investment in con­
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servation practices seems to present analytical interest. 
Other studies that could possibly be undertaken making use of our 
dynamic models on the basis of the MINK data include an analysis of inter­
temporal inefficiencies in other types of leases such as livestock and 
cash leases. Our model could also be used to study the effect of differ­
ent price expectations on resource allocation. As well the effect of 
changing and flexible basis of sharing for tenant and landlord in crop-
share and livestock leases is of interest. 
This model for investigating inter-temporal inefficiencies in leas­
ing systems could also be adapted for application in studying tenancy 
arrangements and tenure systems of other countries and in particular 
those of the under-developed countries. The main difficulty there would 
be the acquirement of accurate coefficients. 
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X. APPENDICES 
A. HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 
Family consumption is a part of the tenant's fixed costs. The latter 
also include $938.27 for machinery depreciation, $150 for personal 
property tax and $275 for income tax. 
The household consumption items include, apart from food, clothes, 
household operations and repairs and furnishing, $729 for health insurance 
and medical items and $282 for miscellaneous items such as recreation, 
education, charity and others. 
The landlord pays $275 for income tax, $670.80 for real estate 
taxes. The owner-operator pays $250 for income tax, $670.80 for real 
estate taxes apart from the same household and other fixed costs as the 
tenant. 
B. YIELD AND FERTILIZER ESTIMATES 
Table 18. Estimated first and second year crop yields for various levels of conservation and 
fertilization 
Land Aa 
Practices: Conservation Contouring Terracing' 
Fertilizers: No Low High No Low High No Low High 












43 48 63 45 50 65 48 53 68 
30 35 42 30 35 42 33 38 45 
43 48 63 45 50 65 48 53 68 
20 24 26 22 25 27 23 26 28 
2.2 2.5 3.2 2.2 2.5 3.2 2.2 2.5 3.2 
43 48 68 48 53 72 48 53 72 
2.2 2.5 3.2 2.2 2.5 3.2 2.2 2.5 3.2 
2.2 2.5 3.2 2.2 2.5 3.2 2.2 2.5 3.2 
43 48 63 45 50 65 
^Low-medium fertilization practices in 1958 and 1959. Assume that rotation was CCOMM or COM. 
^10 pounds KgO on all high corn. 
Table 18(Continued) 
Land B& 
Practices: Conservation Contouring Terracing 
Fertilizers No Low High No Low High No Low High 












32 34 47 34 37 50 40 42 56 
20 25 32 • 21 26 33 24 29 36 
32 34 47 34 37 50 40 42 56 
17 18 20 17 18 20 20 21 22 
2.0 2.2 2.8 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.1 2.3 3.0 
30 35 48 33 "38 52 38 42 57 
2.0 2.2 2.8 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.1 2.3 3.0 
2.0 2.2 2.8 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.1 2.3 3.0 
32 34 47 34 37 50 
Source: John T. Pesek and Frank F. Riecken, Agronomy Department, Iowa State University. Private 
communication. Feb. 22. 1960. 





































Corn. 2 Corn 





40b 45 63 42 . 47 65 45 50 68 37 42 63 39 44 65 42 47 68 
40 45 63 42 47 65 45 50 68 
19 23 25 21 24 26 22 25 27 
40 45 63 42 47 65 45 50 68 
30 35 42 30 35 42 33 38 45 
30 35 42 30 35 42 33 38 45 
2.2 2.4 3.0 2.2 2.4 3.0 2.2 2.4 3.0 
50 55 69 55 60 74 55 60 74 
20 24 26 22 25 27 23 26 28 
50 55 69 55 60 74 55 60 74 
45 50 68 50 55 72 50 55 72 
40 45 63 42 47 65 45 50 68 
39 42 63 39 44 65 42 47 68 
40 45 63 42 47 65 45 50 68 
19 23 25 21 24 26 22 25 27 
Low-medium fertilizer practices in 1958 and 1959 
"*10 pounds KgO on all high corn 
Table 19 (Continued) 
Land Ba 
Conservation: No practices Contouring Terracing 
Fertilizers: No Low High No Low High No Low High 




















30 32 45 31 34 48 35 39 54 
28 30 43 28 31 46 30 37 53 
30 32 45 31 34 48 35 39 54 
16 17 19 16 17 19 19 20 21 
30 32 45 31 34 48 35 39 54 
20 25 32 21 26 33 24 29 36 
20 25 32 21 26 33 24 29 36 
2.0 2.2 2.7 2.0 2.2 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.8 
36 41 54 39 44 57 42 47 60 
17 18 20 17 18 20 20 21 22 
36 41 54 39 44 57 42 47 60 
33 38 50 36 41 53 39 44 58 
30 32 45 31 34 48 35 39 54 
28 30 43 28 31 46 30 37 53 
30 32 45 31 34 48 35 39 54 
16 17 19 16 17 19 19 20 21 
John T. Pesek and Frank F. Reicken, Agronomy Department, Iowa State University. 
Feb. 22, 1960 
Private Communication 





























or CCC Sb 
Corn4 30 
Soybeans,. 18 





After CCCO or C Sb CO 
Meadow^ 
Meadow, 
2 . 2  
2 . 2  
After CCOM or C Sb 0M 
Meadow, 2.2 
Corn,. 50 
After C Sb D Sb 
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2 . 2  
2 . 2  


































Conservation: No practices Contours Terraces 
Fertilizers: No Low High No Low High No Low High 
NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP NP 
After MMCC 
Corn, 40 45 63 
Com, 37 42 63 
Corn, 40 45 63 
Soybeans,. 19 23 25 
After MMCSb 
Corn, 44 49 68 
Soybeans, 19 23 25 
Corn, 44 49 69 
Com, 40 45 63 
Corn, 44 49 68 
Oats* 30 35 42 
After COMM 
Corn, 50 55 69 










































































Corn, 22 28 40 
Corng 22 28 40 
or CCC Sb 
Corn, 22 28 40 
Soybeans,. 15 16 19 
or CSbOSb 
Com, 22 28 40 
Oats% 20 24 32 
Oats: 20 24 32 


















































Table 20 (Continued) i 
Land B3 
Conservation: No practices Contouring Terracinfc 
Fertilizers: No Low High No Low High No Low High 
N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P 
After CCCO or CSbCO 
Meadow^ 2.0 2.; 2.8 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.1 2.3 3.0 
Meadow^ 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.1 2.3 3.0 
After CCOM or CSbOM 
Meadow, 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.1 2.3 3.0 
Corn.. 36 41 54 39 44 57 42 47 60 
After CSbCSb 
Corn. 28 30 43 28 31 46 30 37 53 
Soybeans 15 16 19 15 15 19 18 19 21 
After MMCC 
Corn, 30 32 45 31 34 48 35 39 54 
Corng 28 30 43 28 31 46 30 37 53 
Corn^ 30 32 45 31 34 48 35 39 54 
Soybeans 16 17 19 16 17 19 19 20 21 
After MMCSb 
Corn, 32 37 50 35 4 53 38 43 57 
Soybeans^ 16 17 19 16 17 19 19 20 21 
Corn, 32 37 50 35 40 53 38 43 57 
Cornc 30 32 45 31 34 48 35 39 54 
Corn, 32 37 50 35 40 53 38 43 58 
OatSg 20 25 32 21 26 33 24 29 , 36 
Table 20 (Continued) 
Land B 
Conservation: No practices Contouring Terracing 
Fertilizers : No Low High No Low High No Low High 
N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P 
After COMM 
Corn^ 36 41 54 39 44 57 42 47 60 
Corn,. 30 35 48 33 38 52 38 42 57 
Source: Frank F. Riecken, W. F. Shrader and David F. Slusher. Agronomy Department, Iowa State 
University. Private communication. Feb, 22, 1960 
Table 21. Pounds per acre of available nutrients supplied by commercial fertilizers for 1st and 2nd 














































































Land B Marshall 8-12% 
5 35+25 5 35+25 5 35+25 
0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 
5 44+25 5 44+25 5 44+25 
0+10 0+10 0+10 
0+10 0+10 0+10 
5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
0+10 0+10 0+10 
5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
5 35+25 5 35+25 
Source: John T. Pesek and Frank F. Riecken. Agronomy Department, Iowa State University. Private 
communication. Feb. 22, 1960 
Table 22. Pounds per acre of available nutrients supplied by commercial fertilizers for 3rd and 
4th year crops and different conserva ion and fertilization levels 
Land A 
Practices: No conservation Contouring Terracinh 
Fertilizers No Low High No Low High No Low High 
N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P 
After C 
Corn 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 50+10 
Com 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 50+10 
Corn 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 50+10 
Soybeans 
Corn 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 50+10 
Oats 0+10 10+0 0+10 10+0 0+10 10+0 
Oats 0+10 10+0 0+10 10+0 0+10 10+0 
Meadow 0+10 0+10 0+10 
After MM 
Corn 5 , 5+10 5 5+10 5 5+10 
Soybeans 
Corn 5 5+10 5 5+10 5 5+10 
Corn 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 50+10 
After CSb 
Corn 5 35+10 5 35+10 5 35+10 
Corn 5 50+10 5 50*10 5 50+10 
Corn 5 35+10 5 35+10 5 35+10 
Soybeans 
Table 22 (Continued) 
Land B 
Practices: No conservation Contouring Terracing 
Fertilizers: No Low High No Low High No Low High 
N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P 
After C 
Corn 5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
Corn 5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
Corn 5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
Soybeans 0+10 0+10 0+10 
Com 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 50+10 
Oats 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 
Oats 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 
Meadow 
After MM 
Corn 5 5+25 5 5+25 5 5+25 
Soybeans 0+10 0+10 0+10 
Com r 5 5+25 5 5+25 5 5+25 
Corn 60+15 60+15 60+15 
After iGSb 
Corn 5 50+20 5 50+20 5 50+20 
Corn 5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
Corn 5 50+20 5 50+20 5 50+20 
Soybeans 0+10 0+10 0+10 
Source: John T. Pesek and Frank F. Riecken. Agronomy Department, Iowa State University. Private 
communication. Feb. 22, 1960 
Table 23. Pounds per acre of available nutrients supplied by commercial fertilizers for 5th and 
6th year crops and different conservation and fertilization levels 
Land A 
Practices: No conservation Contouring Terracing 
Fertilizers: No Low High No Low High No Low High 
N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P 
After CCC or CCSb or CSbCSb 
Corn 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 50+10 
Corn 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 50+10 
Corn 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 
Soybeans 
Corn 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 50+10 
Oats 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 
Oats 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 
Meadow 0+10 0+10 0+10 
After CCO or CSbCO 
Meadow 0+10 0+10 0+10 
Meadow 0+10 0+10 0+10 
After CCOM, C Sb Oil 
Meadow 0+10 0+10 0+10 
Corn 5 5+10 5 5+10 5 5+10 
After CSbCSb 
Corn 5 50+10 5 50+10 5 50+10 
Soybeans 
Table 23 (Continued) 
Land A 
Practices : No conservation Contouring Terracing 
Fertilizers: No Low High No Low High No Low High 



























































After CCC or CCSb or CSbCSb 
Corn 5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
Corn 5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
Corn 5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
Soybeans 0+10 0+10 0+10 
Corn 5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
Oats 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 
Oats 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 
Table 23 (Continued) 
Land B 
Practices : No conservation Contouring Terracing 
Fertilizers: No Low High No Low • High No Low High 
i 
N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P 
After CCCO , 
CSbCO 
Meadow 




Corn 5 5+25 5 5+25 5 5+25 
After CSbCSb 
Corn 5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
Soybeans 0+10 0+10 0+10 
After MMCC 
Corn 5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
Corn 5 60+15 5 60+15 5 60+15 
Corn 5 60+15 5 69+15 5 60+15 
Soybeans 0+10 0+10 0+10 
After MMCSb 
Corn 5 50+20 5 50+20 5 50+20 
Soybeans 0+10 0+10 0+10 
Corn 5 50+20 * 5 50+20 5 50+20 
Corn 5q 60+15 ' 5 60+15 5 60+15 
Corn 5 50+20 5 50+20 5 50+20 
Oats 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 0+10 10+10 
Source: Private communication, John T. Pesej and Frank F,.Riecken, Agronomy Department, Iowa State 
University. Feb. 22, 1960 
